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INTRODUCTION
[T]he general welfare and security of the Nation and
the health and living standards of its people require. . . the
elimination of substandard and other inadequate housing
through the clearance of slums and blighted areas, and the
realization as soon as feasible of the goal of a decent home
and a suitable living environment for every American family
The federal government has long recognized that low in-
come people are unable to obtain decent shelter without sub-
stantial government assistance. In this regard, Congress re-
cently passed the Housing and Community Development Act
* Professor of Law, University of Toledo. A.B. 1966, University of Michigan; J.D.
1969, Case Western Reserve University.
** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Toledo. B.A. 1971, Villanova Univer-
sity; J.D. 1974, University of Pennsylvania.
I Housing Act of 1949, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970) (Declaration of Policy) (empha-
sis added).
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of 19742 (HCDA) which amended the Housing Act of 1937 to
eliminate certain federal housing programs, modify others, and
create the section 8 housing program for low income housing
assistance. 3 Since passage of the HCDA, section 8 has been the
primary federal program providing additional units of low cost
housing.' Nevertheless, the conventional public housing pro-
gram which provides financial support for housing that is
planned and operated by public housing authorities (PHA's)
retains vitality. 5 Additional units continue to be authorized
under the conventional public housing program as modified by
the HCDA of 1974.1
2 Act of Aug. 22, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (codified in scattered
sections of 12, 42 U.S.C.). The § 23 leased housing program created by the Housing
and Urban Development Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1421a (1970), has been replaced by
the § 8 program. Under § 23, public housing authorities leased new or existing housing
in the private market for the purpose of subleasing it to low income tenants at rents
affordable to them. Many features of the § 23 program have been incorporated into
the § 8 program. For a recent discussion of the § 23 program, see Note, The New Leased
Housing Program: How Tenantable a Proposition?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1145, 1158-74
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Leased Housing Program].
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 (HCDA) provides that
HUD may not unilaterally apply the § 8 policies to § 23 programs in operation. 42
U.S.C. § 1421(b) (note) (Supp. V 1975). However, provisions have been made for
voluntary conversion of projects from § 8 to § 23. HUD Notice HPMC-FHA 75-20
(1975). Problems involved in this conversion process are discussed in HUD OFcE OF
POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH, A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY ON THE SECTION 8
EXISTING HOUSING PROGRAM, 38-41 (June 30, 1976) [hereinafter cited as A REPORT TO
THE SECRETARY].
3 HCDA of 1974, § 201(a) 8, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (Supp. V 1975) (amending United
States Housing Act, ch. 896, § 8, 50 Stat. 891 (1937)).
' See Housing and Urban Affairs Daily, Aug. 23, 1974, at 102 (views of former
HUD Secretary James Lynn). The Carter Administration is continuing this policy. 4
Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 784 (1977) (current developments). In fiscal year 1976 and
the transition quarter, $490,581,000 was allocated in contract authority for § 8. The
authorization for fiscal 1977 was $350,000,000. 4 Hous. & DEV. REP. (BNA) 1159 (1977).
See note 41 infra for further details.
The § 236 Rental Housing Assistance Program, 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1970 & Supp.
V 1975), was extended for two years by the HCDA of 1974, and further extended to
September 30, 1977 by the 1976 Housing Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 94-375, § 3,
90 Stat. 1068-1070, and regulations, 24 C.F.R. §§ 235.25, .30 (1977). The revived
program began making new reservations for units in January 1976. 4 Hous. & DEv. REP.
(BNA) 738 (1977).
42 U.S.C. § 1401-1436 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). This program has been signifi-
cantly revised by the HCDA of 1974 in statutory provisions codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437
(1970 & Supp. V 1975). See generally Leased Housing Program, supra note 2, at 1147-
58 for a discussion of the program.
' 42 U.S.C. § 1437c (Supp. V 1975). See also 1976 Housing Authorization Act,
Pub. L. No. 94-375, § 4, 90 Stat. 1070. Eighty-five million dollars have been appropri-
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Before the section 8 program, residents affected by federal
housing programs had been granted extensive procedural pro-
tections through the courts, legislation, and regulations.' Since
the role of the PHA's is much smaller under section 8 than the
conventional program, tenants' rights regarding admissions
and evictions are unclear. First, this article will describe the
function of the section 8 housing program, including the issue
of site selection. Second, the eviction process under section 8
will be analyzed in light of the requirements of procedural due
process. Finally, the admissions procedures will be discussed in
terms of due process.
I. THE SECTION 8 HOUSING PROGRAM
The section 8 program, by subsidizing rents of low income
ated for new public housing construction by the HUD-Independent Agencies Appropri-
ation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 94-378, 90 Stat. 1095. This will finance the construction
or acquisition of approximately 37,000 public housing units. 4 Hous. & DEV. REP.
(BNA) 871 (1977). Under new HUD policies, family units, as opposed to those for the
elderly, will be emphasized and scattered site housing will be given preference over the
traditional large projects. 24 C.F.R. Part 841 (1977). See 4 Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA)
682, 729 (1976) for further explanation.
Eligibility for public housing has been substantially modified under the HCDA of
1974. Prior to 1974, public housing units were solely for "families of low income,"
defined as those in the lowest income group who cannot afford to pay enough for
housing to cause the private market to supply decent housing. 42 U.S.C. § 1402(2)
(Supp. V 1975). UndQr the HCDA of 1974 public housing projects must include
"families with a broad range of incomes and. . . avoid concentrations of low-income
and deprived families with serious social problems . . . ." Id. § 1437d(c)(4)(A). This
provision is reinforced by a requirement that housing authorities cannot qualify for
federal operating subsidies unless the aggregate rentals required to be paid by its
tenants equal one-fifth of the income of the tenants. Id. § 1437g; 24 C.F.R. § 860.407
(1977). See Bishop, Assisted Housing Under the Housing and Community Develop-
ment Act of 1974, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE Rav. 672 (1975).
Procedural rights in evictions from conventional public housing are recognized
in Caulder v. Durham Hous. Auth., 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
1003 (1971); Escalera v. New York City Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970); 24 C.F.R. § 866.50-.59 (1977) (grievance procedures and
requirements); id. § 866.1-.6 (1976) (dwelling leases, procedures and requirements).
Regarding procedural rights in evictions from federally subsidized housing, see, e.g.,
Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973) and 24 C.F.R. Part 450 (1977) (evictions
from certain subsidized and HUD owned projects).
Procedural rights in admissions to conventional public housing are recognized in
the HCDA of 1974, § 201(a)6(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(3) (Supp. V 1975); 24 C.F.R.
§ 860.201-.207 (1977). See Needo v. Housing Auth., 335 F. Supp. 1397 (E.D. Wis. 1971);
Davis v. Toledo Metro. Hous. Auth., 311 F. Supp. 795 (N.D. Ohio 1970). Cf. Colon v.
Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (procedural rights
in admission to federally subsidized housing).
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people, can be viewed as a type of housing allowance providing
direct cash payments to tenants to enable them to obtain de-
cent housing in the private market.8 The Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development (HUD) pays owners of existing,
new, or rehabilitated rental units the difference between the
contract rents, which generally cannot exceed a federally deter-
mined "fair market rent" for a unit, and fifteen to twenty-five
percent of the incomes of assisted tenants.' Section 8 creates
three categories of assisted housing: newly constructed, sub-
stantially rehabilitated, and existing housing. In general, the
section 8 newly constructed and substantially rehabilitated
programs are administered by HUD with the participating
owners having substantial control of management. In addition
to HUD and the owners, PHA's play a significant role in the
existing housing program. 10
HUD implements the newly constructed and substantially
rehabilitated programs by contracting directly with owners or
prospective owners of the housing units to pay the difference
See Whitman, Federal Housing Assistance for the Poor: Old Problems and New
Directions, 9 URB. LAW. 1, 55-59 (1977). For a brief discussion on the theory of housing
allowances and the implication of that theory for the program prior to § 8 (the so-called
revised § 23 housing program) see Leased Housing Program, supra note 2, at 1165.
' HCDA of 1974, § 201(a)8, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (Supp. V 1975). See notes 32-37 infra
and accompanying text for a discussion of circumstances under which the rents may
exceed the fair market figure. See note 26 infra regarding exceptions to the rule that
at least 25% of the income must be paid by tenants.
HUD regulations implement the § 8 program: 24 C.F.R. Part 880 (1977) (newly
constructed); id. Part 881 (substantially rehabilitated); id. Part 882 (existing housing).
Owners of § 8 housing may be either private or public. In addition, HUD has
issued special regulations for § 8 housing administered by "public housing agencies."
24 C.F.R. § 883 (1977). These regulations repeat many of the provisions contained in
the general regulations and will not be specifically discussed here. The regulations for
the newly constructed housing and substantially rehabilitated housing are virtually
identical. Therefore, in discussing the two programs, citations to the latter will not be
made unless they vary from the provisions for newly constructed housing.
The § 8 program does not provide direct financing to developers or builders of
leased housing. See 24 C.F.R. § 880.115 (1977) and the discussion of the fair market
rent mechanism in notes 32-41 infra and accompanying text.
1o See Leased Housing Program, supra note 2, at 1166-74 for an excellent compari-
son of conventional public housing and § 23 with the § 8 program regulations which
have since been renumbered and revised. See also 2 Hous. & DEv. REv. (BNA) 30:0055-
79 (Ref. file); Note, The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 - Who
Shall Live in Public Housing?, 25 CATH. U.L. REV. 320, 329-34 (1976); Note, Federal
Leased Housing Assistance in Private Accommodations: Section 8, 8 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 676, 679-83 (1975).
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between the contract rent and the tenant's share of rent.1'
PHA's may participate as owners in the section 8 newly con-
structed or substantially rehabilitated programs through an-
nual contribution contracts with HUD. 12 The assistance pay-
ments contracts can run for five years and are renewable for up
to twenty years at the owner's option.'3 In the case of existing
housing, HUD enters into annual contribution contracts with
PHA's which, in turn, contract with owners of suitable rental
units to make assistance payments.'4 The contracts are for one
to three years, the same as the lease term between the tenant
and owner.'" In the existing housing program, the PHA's are
responsible for certifying eligible persons and issuing
"certificates of family participation" which are presented to
prospective landlords." In the existing and newly constructed
or substantially rehabilitated programs the eligible tenant
must enter into a lease with the owner.'7 However, in the exist-
" 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
,2 Id. In addition, see, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 880.214 (1977). Special regulations apply
to state housing agencies participating in the newly constructed or substantially reha-
bilitated programs. 24 C.F.R. § 883.301-.329 (1977). In addition, under HUD's regula-
tions, an owner may also seek assistance through a public housing authority instead
of directly through HUD. This arrangement, called a "private owner-PHA-HUD op-
tion" in the regulations, is accomplished through the payment of an annual contribu-
tions contract by HUD to the PHA. If this is done, the PHA undertakes all administra-
tive responsibilities for the housing assistance payments, which would otherwise fall
to HUD. Id. § 880.212.
13 Id. § 880.109. The fiscal 1977 Supplemental Authorization Act contained a
section extending the maximum contract term to 30 years. Pub. L. No. 95-24, § 101(c),
91 Stat. 55. When a project is owned or financed by a state or local agency, the
assistance payments contract can be renewed for a total of 40 years. 24 C.F.R. §
880.109(h) (1977).
'1 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975); 24 C.F.R. § 882.210 (1977). Section
1437f(b)(1) states that "in areas where no public housing agency has been organized
or where the Secretary determines that a public housing agency is unable to implement
[the existing housing program]," HUD is permitted to perform the role of the PHA.
24 C.F.R. § 882.121(b) (1977).
Is 24 C.F.R. § 882.107 (1977). In situations where the family remains as tenants
and the lease is renewed, the contract may remain in effect until the expiration of the
annual contribution contract which is five years. Id.
" Id. § 882.209. Under the newly constructed and substantially rehabilitated pro-
grams, eligibility and admission are the responsibility of the owners. Id. § 880.119(a).
17 Id. § 880.218(b)(4) (newly constructed); id. §§ 882.103(a), .210(a) (existing
housing). The owner may contract management duties out to any private or public
(e.g., PHA) entity. Id. § 880.119(b). PHA's which participate in the newly constructed
and substantially rehabilitated programs may not perform management functions
under contract. Id. See Leased Housing Program, supra note 2, at 1173 n.141. A similar
1977]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66
ing housing program the certifying PHA is to provide assis-
tance to eligible persons in finding suitable accommodations."8
The owners are responsible for maintenance and manage-
ment, including selection of tenants and termination of tenan-
cies. 9 Where existing housing units are involved, however, the
private owner acts in an advisory capacity to the PHA20 in
terminating tenancies.-In the event that a section 8 unit be-
comes vacant, assistance payments will be continued to the
owner under certain circumstances, such as when an assisted
tenant has abandoned a unit in breach of the lease or where the
landlord is making a "good faith effort" to fill the vacancy.
21
In order to be eligible for section 8 housing a family's in-
come generally must not exceed eighty percent of the median
income for the area, as determined and adjusted by HUD.22 At
provision governs the existing housing program. 24 C.F.R. § 882.117(b) (1977). How-
ever, the Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91
Stat. 1111, authorized HUD to permit a PHA implementing a § 8 existing housing
program to undertake management functions for the owner of a unit covered by the
program.
24 C.F.R. § 882.209(b)(d) (1977).
" 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(e)(2) (Supp. V 1975); 24 C.F.R. § 880.119 (1977) (newly
constructed); 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1) (Supp. V 1975); 24 C.F.R. § 882.117 (1977)
(existing housing).
" The statute provides that the PHA "shall have the sole right to give notice to
vacate, with the owner having the right to make representations to the agency for
terminaton of tenancy." 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1975); 24 C.F.R. §
882.215 (1977).
22 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(4) (Supp. V 1975). The regulations provide that the owner
may receive up to 80% of a unit's market rent for a 60-day period subject to certain
conditions. 24 C.F.R. § 880.107(b) (1977) (newly constructed); id. § 882.105(b) (exist-
ing housing). Under § 2(d) of the Housing Authorization Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
375, 90 Stat. 1068, HUD may continue making assistance payments to owners of
certain vacant § 8 units for up to one year in an amount equal to the debt service
attributable to the vacant units. Id. § 880.107(d) (newly constructed). See also § 201(d)
of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat.
1111, providing the expanded assistance payment coverage even when the vacant unit
is insured under the National Housing Act.
2 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975). HUD regulations refine this standard
to define "family" for income purposes as having four members. Adjustments are then
made for larger or smaller families. For example, a three-person family is low income
if it earns less than 72% of the area median, while a family of five may earn as much
as 85% and still be low income. See 24 C.F.R. § 880.117 (1977) (newly constructed);
id. § 882.113 (existing housing). The 1976 Housing Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 94-
375, 90 Stat. 1067, provides that HUD may issue regulations permitting certain for-
merly ineligible single persons to occupy § 8 housing. No more than 10% of the units
under the jurisdiction of any public housing authority may be occupied by single
persons made eligible by that provision. Regulations appear at 24 C.F.R. Part 812
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least thirty percent of the families assisted under section 8
must have "very low incomes" at the time of initial rental; that
is, their incomes may not exceed fifty percent of the median
income for the area. 2s It is noteworthy that applicants rejected
for section 8 housing have no statutory right to respond at an
informal hearing.
24
It was noted above that the tenant's share of the rent is
limited to a percentage of his income, usually twenty-five per-
cent. However, large very low income families, very large low
income families, and families with "exceptional expenses" pay
only fifteen percent of income in rent.25 The rent for other fami-
lies is twenty-five percent of income after deductions for minors
and "unusual expenses. '2 Under these rent formulae, section
8 tenants will often have higher rental payments than if they
resided in traditional public housing.
27
(1977). Single elderly, disabled, and displaced persons were eligible for § 8 housing
from the outset. 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(2) (Supp. V 1975).
= 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437f(c)(7), (f)(2) (Supp. V 1975). Although the statute applies the
30% requirement to the entire § 8 program, the regulations impose the requirement
on each project. 24 C.F.R. § 880.117 (1977) (newly constructed); id. § 882.113 (existing
housing). The regulations also require that a developer participating in new construc-
tion (or substantial rehabilitation) must continue to "exercise his best efforts to main-
tain at least 30 percent occupancy of contract units by Very Low-Income Families."
Id. § 880.117. PHA's are under a similar duty in administering the existing housing
program. Id. § 882.113.
24 Such a right exists in the conventional public housing program. 42 U.S.C. §
1437d(c)(3) (Supp. V 1975). This statutory provision does not apply to § 8. Id. §
1437f(h).
Id. § 1437f(c)(3). Regulations define a household with six or more minors as
"large" and a household with eight or more minors as "very large." 24 C.F.R. § 880.118
(1977) (newly constructed); id. § 882.114 (1977) (existing housing).
26 HUD is authorized to permit families with unusual expenses to pay less than
25% of their income in rent (but not less than 15%). 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(3) (Supp. V
1975). Instead these families must pay 25% of their income but are permitted first to
make deductions from gross income. For example, they may first deduct $300 for each
minor child and medical expenses which exceed 3% of annual income. See 24 C.F.R.
Part 889 (1977).
" If § 8 definitions were applied to public housing tenants, the average family's
rent would increase 24% according to a recent survey of 133 public housing authoriza-
tions conducted by the Urban Institute for HUD. 4 Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 884
(1977). Under the so-called Brooke Amendments, tenants of public housing pay 25%
of their adjusted income in rent, but more deductions from income are permitted than
in § 8. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(1) (Supp. V 1975). In spite of the higher cost of living in
§ 8 housing, it has been reported that some public housing officials are finding that
public housing tenants are interested in moving into § 8 existing housing. A REPORT
TO THE SEcR'raRY, supra note 2, at 40-41. Insofar as the § 8 program effectuates a wider
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Based on the income eligibility requirements and the rent
formulae, the section 8 housing program may result in only
minimal benefit for the lowest income groups. The median
income of all families residing in traditional public housing is
substantially lower than fifty percent of the national median
income. 28 Since only thirty percent of section 8 tenants are
required to be of very low income, i.e., having less than fifty
percent of area median income, the poorest families are being
allocated only a fraction of section 8 housing.29 This result is
intended. The section 8 program is designed to attract tenants
with varying levels of income, a policy generally referred to as
"economic mix."30 Apparently the assumption is that the
poorest families and those with severe social problems will
benefit from being exposed to more stable neighbors. In this
regard, HUD may give preference to applications for section 8
newly constructed or substantially rehabilitated housing con-
tracts that propose to assist only twenty percent of a building's
units, except where the building contains fifty or less units or
is designated for the elderly.'
choice of housing locations, this should be encouraged. See notes 84-93 infra and
accompanying text for a discussion of site selection for § 8 existing housing.
11 Note, The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974-Who Shall Live
in Public Housing?, 25 CATH. U.L. REv. 320, 325 (1976). See note 5 supra concerning
changes in eligibility for conventional public housing which will adversely affect people
of very low income.
' It is likely that § 8 landlords will tend to select tenants at the higher end of the
median scale rather than those at the lower end because they will assume that the
former would be better tenants.
It should be noted that there is some evidence that the § 8 existing housing
program is benefiting more very low income families than required by law. According
to a HUD study, 84% of the tenants in existing housing have very low incomes. A
REPORT TO THE SECRETARY, supra note 2, at 6. However, the same study indicates that
large families are not being served well by the existing housing program. Id. at 19.
30 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (Supp. V 1975). The purpose of the § 8 program is to aid
"lower-income families in obtaining a decent place to live and . .. [to promote]
economically mixed housing . . . ... Id.
11 Id. § 1437f(c)(5). See 24 C.F.R. § 880.104 (1977) (newly constructed). The 20%
priority may be used to rank only those applications which have been received in any
60-day period. On the other hand, HUD requires its field offices to encourage proposals
which will contribute to the goal that 20% of the § 8 housing be three-bedroom (or
larger) units. Id.
Since projects can be 100% subsidized, the design of § 8 is such that it may result
in less "economic mix" than in the § 23 program. It is likely that most § 8 newly
constructed projects will have a high percentage subsidized unit. In fact, the Govern-
ment Accounting Office found that many developers felt that few would submit appli-
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The subsidy HUD pays to owners of section 8 units is the
difference between the contract rent, generally not exceeding
the "fair market rent" for a unit, and the tenant's share of the
rent. Thus, the "establishment of realistic fair market rentals
[is] a prime factor in the success or failure" of the program.
32
HUD is required, at least annually, to calculate fair market
rentals for existing and newly constructed units of various
types and sizes.3 The assistance contracts between HUD and
owners or between PHA's and owners specify a maximum
monthly rent (including utilities) for the rental units, includ-
ing the tenant's contribution. Maximum rent may not exceed
the fair market rent by more than ten percent unless HUD
determines that local needs warrant up to twenty percent
excess. 4 Assistance contracts also provide that maximum rents
will be adjusted annually to correspond to changes in fair mar-
ket rentals 5.3  These adjustments are automatic, except in the
cations for mixed income projects. They reason that if 80% of a development could be
rented without subsidy, then so could the entire development. GOVERNMENT AccouNT-
ING OFFICE, MAJOR CHANGES ARE NEEDED IN THE NEW LEASED HOUSING PROGRAM REPORT
65-66 (Jan. 28, 1977) [hereinafter cited as GAO REPORT]. See Note, Federal Leased
Housing in Private Accommodations: Section 8, 8 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 676, 689-92
(1975).
2 JOINT CONFERENCE COMMITTEE CONFERENCE REPORT ON HousING & COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT ACr OF 1974, H.R. REP. No. 93-1979, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 139 (1974).
1 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(1) (Supp. V 1975). The regulations define the term "fair
market rent" as "[.t]he rent, including utilities (except telephone), ranges and refrig-
erators, and all maintenance, management and other services, which . . . would be
required to be paid in order to obtain privately developed and owned, existing, decent,
safe and sanitary rental housing of modest (non-luxury) nature with suitable amenities
.... " 24 C.F.R. § 882.102 (1977) (existing housing). A similar definition appears in
the regulations for new housing. Id. § 880.102(e). The fair market rents are to be
published in the Federal Register for comment prior to implementation. 42 U.S.C. §
1437f(c)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
1' 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(1) (Supp. V 1975). By regulation, the maximum rent in
the newly constructed program may exceed the fair market by up to 10% only if the
HUD area office determines that this is.warranted by special circumstances. The HUD
regional office has authority to permit maximum rent to exceed fair market rent by
20% in special circumstances. In either case, the contract rent must be "reasonable."
24 C.F.R. § 880.108 (1977). In the existing housing program there is greater flexibility:
PHA's may approve maximum rents exceeding fair markets rents by up to 10% on a
unit-by-unit basis for as many as 20% of their units under the annual contribution
contract. Id. § 882.106(a)(2). The HUD area office has authority to permit maximum
rents up to 20% over the fair market rent. However, maximum rents can exceed
average rents in the area for available standard units of similar size or type only with
the permission of regional office. Id. § 882.106(a)(3)-(4). Special provisions are made
for "recently completed housing." Id. § 882.120(b).
11 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1975). HUD also has discretion to make
adjustments "on the basis of a reasonable formula." Id.
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case of existing housing. 6 Further increases may be made if an
owner can "clearly demonstrate" financial need due to other
variables such as property tax or utility rate increases.3 7
By defining fair market rents HUD can regulate the num-
ber and quality of section 8 housing units. 8 If the market rents
are set too low, private developers will not participate and
suitable units will not be available. It has been reported that
low fair market rents have restricted activity in the newly con-
structed, substantially rehabilitated, and existing housing pro-
grams.39 On the other hand, there are dangers in setting the fair
market rents too high. Since a tenant's contribution is based
on personal income, higher maximum rents will not affect him.
However, federal funding is limited, and for every increase in
fair market rents, fewer units can be funded under the pro-
gram." Because of these problems, activity in the section 8
program was generally slow at its inception in August 1974.41
11 HUD publishes an "automatic adjustment factor" for newly constructed units.
24 C.F.R. § 880.110(b) (1977). In existing housing, adjustments are limited to changes
in the fair market rent and are made only in the years when the landlord can terminate
the lease. Id. § 882.108(a).
31 Id. § 880.110(c) (newly constructed); id. § 882.108(a) (existing housing). See 42
U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(2)(B)-(C) (Supp. V 1975).
3, See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(6) (Supp. V 1975).
A Government Accounting Office study, dated January 1977, suggests that
higher rents than those charged for private units may be necessary to bring developers
of family housing into the program in view of higher costs and risks associated with
low-income housing. GAO REPORT, supra note 31, at 16-30. An earlier HUD study also
indicates that low fair market rents have inhibited the Existing Housing program,
especially with respect to large units with three or more bedrooms. A REPORT TO THE
SECRETARY, supra note 2, at 19. A National Association of Housing and Redevelopment
Officials survey of public housing agencies made similar findings. 4 Hous. & Day. REP.
(BNA) 477 (1976). Owners of potential § 8 existing housing are also reluctant because
they feel that participation involves much red tape. GAO REPORT, supra note 31, at
33-36. HUD recently has become more flexible in allowing maximum rents to exceed
fair market rentals in the newly constructed and substantially rehabilitated programs.
4 Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 729-30 (1977).
Vacancy rates also play an important part in whether landlords participate in §
8. If vacancy rates are low, the profits from purely private units rise and landlords are
less likely to become involved in a federal program. A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY, supra
note 2. See Note, Federal Leased Housing in Private Accommodations, 8 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 676, 688 (1975).
11 It is estimated that in 1974, there were more than 1,000,000 low income families
of four or more living in over-crowded or substandard housing who needed different
housing than they occupied. A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY, supra note 2, at 19-20.
1, See GAO REPORT, supra note 31, at 5-9. At the close of calendar 1976, 153,962
§ 8 units were occupied. The figures are somewhat deceptive, however. Of these occu-
pancies, 61,288 were in existing units under the loan management program for finan-
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With respect to site selection, courts in recent years have
required HUD to consider the effect of proposed locations upon
existing and developing concentrations of racial minorities.2
Congress expanded this policy in the HCDA of 1974 which
seeks to avoid residential concentrations of low income persons.
This policy recognizes the need of low income persons and mi-
norities to migrate from the inner city to gain access to job
opportunities, improved housing, and better living environ-
ments.4 3 Section 8 of the HCDA of 1974 states that the purpose
cially troubled HUD-insured projects. 4 Hous. & DEV. REP. (BNA) 874 (1977). See
GAO REPORT, supra note 31, at 50-54. Of the 92,674 units in regular § 8, 87,512 were
in existing units, 6,431 were newly constructed and 531 were substantially rehabili-
tated. In addition, approximately 42,000 newly constructed or substantially rehabili-
tated units have been started under the program through May 5, 1977. Three-fourths
of the starts were elderly units. 4 Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 874, 1116 (1977). See GAO
REPORT, supra note 31, at 65-66 concerning developers' apparent preference for elderly,
as opposed to family, housing. Through fiscal 1976, there were 553,522 § 8 unit reserva-
tions. Of these 241,056 were in the regular existing housing programs, 116,772 in loan
management, 177,920 in newly constructed, and 17,774 in substantially rehabilitated.
Of the newly constructed or substantially rehabilitated, 124,859 were for the elderly. 4
Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 874 (1977).
HUD has a goal of 292,000 occupied units for fiscal 1977: 269,500 in existing
housing, including loan management, 19,800 in newly constructed and 2,700 in sub-
stantially rehabilitated. 4 Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 1086-87 (1977). The fiscal 1977
goal for reservations is 321,500 with 166,440 new units, 24,760 substantially rehabili-
tated, and 130,300 existing units. The fiscal 1977 goal for starts is approximately
80,000. 4 Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 1087 (1977).
Perhaps a greater problem for § 8 housing is evidenced in a GAO study, dated July
1976, that traditional public housing costs less than § 8 new construction. It was
unclear whether § 8 existing housing was less costly than traditional public housing.
The study considered both direct subsidy costs and indirect costs, such as reduction
in federal tax revenues because of depreciation, property tax abatement, and losses to
the FHA insurance fund because of foreclosures. 4 Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 242-43
(1976).
,1 Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976). For a brief history of the Gautreaux
litigation, see Rubinowitz & Dennis, School Desegregation versus Public Housing De-
segregation: The Local District and the Metropolitan District, 10 URB. L. ANN. 145,
146-48 n.4 (1975). See also Graves v. Rommey, 502 F.2d 1062 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 963 (1975); Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3rd Cir 1970); Banks v.
Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972), modified, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973); Crow
v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir.
1972); Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969); 24 C.F.R. § 200.700-.710
(1976). See also proposed amendments to these regulations in 42 Fed. Reg. 4,299
(1977). See generally Note, Racial Discrimination in Public Housing Site Selection, 23
STAN. L. REv. 63 (1970), for a historical perspective on discrimination in public hous-
ing.
,1 (a) The Congress finds and declares that the Nation's cities, towns,
and smaller urban communities face critical social, economic, and environ-
mental problems arising in significant measure from-(1) . . . the concentra-
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of providing lower income housing assistance is to "[aid] lower
income families in obtaining a decent place to live and [to
promote] economically mixed housiig."" A similar policy is
contained in the HUD regulations governing site selection of
section 8 housing.45
A. Site Selection for Section 8 Newly Constructed and
Substantially Rehabilitated Housing
The HUD regulations require that the sites used for newly
constructed and substantially rehabilitated housing "promote
greater choice of housing opportunities and avoid undue con-
centration of assisted persons in areas containing a high pro-
portion of low income persons."46 Also, the locations of newly
constructed housing must not contribute to minority concen-
trations.4 7 Prospective sites must be accessible to recreational,
tion of persons of lower income in central cities .... (c) The primary
objective of this chapter is the development of variable urban communities,
by providing decent housing and a suitable living environment and expand-
ing economic opportunities, principally for persons of low and moderate
income. Consistent with this primary objective, the Federal assistance pro-
vided in this chapter is for the support of community development activities
which are directed toward the following specific objectives. . . (6) the reduc-
tion of the isolation of income groups within communities and geographical
areas and the promotion of an increase in the diversity and vitality of neigh-
borhoods through the spacial deconcentration of housing opportunities for
persons of lower income and the revitalization of deteriorating or deterior-
ated neighborhoods to attract persons of higher incomes ....
42 U.S.C. § 5301 (Supp. V 1975) (emphasis added). For the legislative history of this
aspect of the Act, see U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4422 (1974). But see City of
Hartford v. Town of Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1032, (2d Cir. 1977) in which these policies
are variously treated by the plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions.
44 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (Supp. V 1975).
43 24 C.F.R. § 880.112 (1977) (newly constructed); id. § 881.112 (substantially
rehabilitated). Since persons holding "certificates of family participation" issued
under the existing housing program are "responsible for finding. . . [a] unit suitable
to the holder's needs and desires in any area where the PHA determines that it is not
legally barred from entering into [Housing Assistance Payments] Contracts," there
are no similar site selection provisions applicable to the existing housing program. Id.
§ 882.103(a). See notes 84-93 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of site
selection for § 8 existing housing.
1, 24 C.F.R. § 880.112(d) (1977) (newly constructed); id. § 881.112(c) (substan-
tially rehabilitated).
17 Id. § 880.112(c) provides that in the new construction program:
The- site shall not be located in
(1) An area of minority concentration unless (i) sufficient, comparable op-
portunities exist for housing for minority families, in the income range to be
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educational, commercial, and health facilities and services,
and other municipal facilities and services.48 In addition, the
location of such assisted housing must comply with any applic-
able conditions in the local Housing Assistance Plan approved
by HUD. 49
The Housing Assistance Plan (HAP) is required in a local
government's application for a grant under Title I of the HCDA
of 1974 and is the link between that program and section 8.11
Title I grants are made to local governments to eliminate slums
and blight, to conserve and expand the supply of low and mod-
erate cost housing, to expand community services, and to re-
duce the geographical isolation of income groups. 51 However,
Title I monies cannot be used for new housing construction or
for housing allowance payments.52 Rather, the local govern-
ments applying for community development block grants must
include a HAP which assesses the housing needs of lower in-
served by the proposed project, outside areas of minority concentration, or
(ii) the project is necessary to meet overriding housing needs which cannot
otherwise feasibly be met in that housing market area. (An "overriding
need" may not serve as the basis for determining that a site is acceptable if
the only reason the need cannot otherwise feasibly be met is that discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, color, religion, creed, sex, or national origin renders
sites outside areas of minority concentration unavailable).
(2) A racially mixed area if the project will cause a significant increase in
the proportion of minority to non-minority residents in the area.
Of course, the sites for substantially rehabilitated housing as well as newly constructed
housing must comply with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 200d
(1970); Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1970); and
Exec. Order No. 11,063, 3 C.F.R. 652 (1962); 24 C.F.R. § 880.112(b) (1977); id. §
881.112(b).
' 24 C.F.R. §§ 880.112(g), 881.112(f) (1977).
' Id. §§ 880.112(0, 881.112(c).
42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5317 (Supp. V 1975), (amended by the Housing Community
Development Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1111).
1, 42 U.S.C. § 5301 (Supp. V 1975). For a general discussion of Title I of the Act,
see H. FRANKLIN, D. FALK & A. LEVIN, IN-ZONING: A Gul.R FOR POLICY MAKERS ON
INCLUSIONARY LAND USE PROGRAMS 59-78 (1975); Fishman, Title I of the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974: New Federal and Local Dynamics in Com-
munity Development, 7 URB. LAW. 189, 189-90 (1975); Kushner, Community Planning
and Development Under the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 8
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 661 (1975); Kushner, Litigation Strategies and Judicial Review
Under Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 11 URa. L.
ANN. 37 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Kushner]; Salsich, Community Develop-
ment-Some Reflections on the Latest Federal Initiative, 19 ST. Louis U.L.J. 293
(1975); 1 Hous. & DEV. REP. (BNA) 09:011-23 (Ref. file).
5, NAACP v. Hills, 412 F. Supp. 102, 110 n.7 (N.D. Cal. 1976); 24 C.F.R. § 570.201
(1977).
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come persons residing or expected to reside in the community,
establishes goals for the number of persons or units to be given
housing assistance, and describes the location of existing and
proposed low income housing. 3
As the primary federal housing program in operation, the
section 8 program often represents the housing "assistance best
suited to the needs of lower income persons in the com-
munity."54 Allocations of section 8 funds made by HUD are
based on the needs set forth in the HAP "to the maximum
extent practicable." 5 Thus, the HAP is an important link be-
tween section 8 and the community development block grant
program of the HCDA.55
No grant may be made . .. unless an application shall have been
submitted to the Secretary in which the applicant ... (4) submits a housing
assistance plan which --
(A) accurately surveys the condition of the housing stock in the community
and assesses the housing assistance needs of lower-income persons (including
elderly and handicapped persons, large families, and persons displaced or to
be displaced) residing in or expected to reside in the community,
(B) specifies a realistic annual goal for the number of dwelling units or
persons to be assisted, including (i) the relative proportion of new, rehabili-
tated, and existing dwelling units, and (ii) the sizes and types of housing
projects and assistance best suited to the needs of lower-income persons in
the community, and
(C) indicates the general locations of proposed housing for lower-income
persons, with the objective of (i) furthering the revitalization of the com-
munity, including the restoration and rehabilitation of stable neighborhoods
to the maximum extent possible, (ii) promoting greater choice of housing
opportunities and avoiding undue concentrations of assisted persons in areas
containing a high proportion of low income persons, and (iii) assuring the
availability of public facilities and services adequate to serve proposed hous-
ing projects.
42 U.S.C. § 5304(a) (4) (Supp. V 1975). See also 24 C.F.R. § 570.303(c) (1977), amended
by § 104(a)(4) of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-108, 91 Stat. 1111.
1 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(4)(B) (Supp. V 1975). It has been HUD policy to use § 8 as
the primary means for providing subsidized housing. See Housing and Urban Affairs
Daily, Aug. 23, 1974, at 102 (views of former HUD Secretary James Lynn). The Carter
Administration plans to continue this policy. 4 Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 784 (1977).
Sixty-two percent of units planned under 1976 HAP's of community development
grantees are to be assisted under § 8. HUD Community Planning and Development
study, cited in 12 Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 232 (1977).
11 Section 207 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, Pub. L.
No. 95-108, 91 Stat. 1111, amending 42 U.S.C. § 1439(d)(1) (Supp. V 1975); 24 C.F.R.
44 891.401-.404 (1977).
" City of Hartford v. Hills, 408 F. Supp. 889, 898 (D. Conn. 1976); see note 63
infra for a discussion of the Hills case.
In its notice accompanying proposed amendments to the regulations governing
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Since HAP's are prepared by local governments (subject
to HUD approval) they constitute a measure of control exer-
cised by local governments on section 8 site selection." Prior to
the enactment of the HCDA of 1974, public housing authorities
were required to enter into cooperation agreements with local
governments in order to become eligible for federal housing
aidA5 Local opposition to project proposals for low income hous-
ing has been a significant barrier to housing development, and
HAP's, HUD stated that HAP's are "one of the most significant parts of the com-
munity development application process, and have a significant impact on various
aspects of HUD-assisted housing program activities." 41 Fed. Reg. 2,348 (1976). Con-
gress also emphasized the importance of the HAP. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1114, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974).
51 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a) (Supp. V 1975). When a § 8 project is proposed for a
community which has a HAP, HUD must inform the local governing body of the
application. The local government has 30 days in which to evaluate the proposal. 42
U.S.C. § 1439(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975); 24 C.F.R. §§ 891.202-.204 (1977).
If the community determines that the proposed project is inconsistent with the
HAP, HUD may approve the application only if it concludes that, based on substantial
evidence, the project is consistent with the HAP. 42 U.S.C. § 1439(a)(2) (Supp. V
1975); 24 C.F.R. § 891.205(b)(2)(c) (1977). If the local government does not respond
within the 30-day period, HUD must make a determination of whether or not the
proposal complies with the HAP. 42 U.S.C. § 1439(a)(3) (Supp. V 1975); 24 C.F.R. §
891.205(b)(3) (1977). If the local government responds that there is no objection, HUD
"may approve the application unless [it] makes an independent determination that
it is inconsistent with the applicable HAP." 24 C.F.R. § 891.205(b)(1) (1977). The
legislative history indicates that HUD may override local objections only on the basis
of substantial reasons. CONF. REP. No. 1279, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 145, reprinted in
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4470-71.
This process does not apply to proposals for § 8 housing involving 12 or fewer units
in a single project or development nor to projects of state housing agencies. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1439(b) (Supp. V "1975); 24 C.F.R. § 891.201(a)(6) (1977). However, the local ap-
proval requirements do apply to state agency projects if the local government objects
to the exception in its HAP. 42 U.S.C. § 1439(b)(3) (Supp. V 1975); 24 C.F.R. §
891.201(c) (1977).
In areas where there are no applicable housing assistance plans (perhaps because
the local government has not applied for community development funds), HUD must
determine that § 8 housing is needed in light of any applicable state housing plans and
any comments given by the local government. 42 U.S.C. § 1439(c) (Supp. V 1975); 24
C.F.R. §§ 891.301-.305 (1977).
" 42 U.S.C. § 1415(7) (1970). In these agreements municipalities promise to ex-
empt all housing projects from local taxes. Id. § 1415(7)(b)(i) (Supp. V 1975). However,
authorities can be required to pay up to 10% of their rent receipts in lieu of taxes. Id.
§ 1410(h) (1970). Local approval of § 23 housing was also required, but only in the form
of a general resolution of assent. Id. § 1421(b)(a)(2). Local governments do not have
to exempt federally subsidized leased housing properties such as § 8 properties from
local taxes, so that no ground for objection exists due to failure to exempt such proper-
ties from local taxes. See generally Note, Federal Leased Housing Assistance in Private
Accommodations: Section 8, 8 MICH. J. L. REF. 676, 686 (1975).
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the requirement of local approval has enabled municipalities
to exclude low income housing at will by refusing to enter into
cooperation agreements. 5 The effect of HAP's on the selection
of sites for newly constructed and substantially rehabilitated
section 8 housing is still uncertain. However, as the following
discussion will indicate, to the extent that local HAP's are
legally sufficient, they can encourage section 8 housing in areas
formerly closed to the conventional public and other low cost
housing programs."0 Whether this goal is realized depends, in
large part, on the content of local HAP's.
HUD has issued detailed regulations describing HAP re-
quirements.61 In regard to the requirement that the HAP iden-
tify low income housing needs in the community, it is notewor-
thy that the needs of lower income persons who are "expected
to reside in the community" must be considered. 2 The
11 See, e.g., Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., 500 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1108 (1974). The validity of the local approval requirement in §
23 leased housing withstood a constitutional challenge before a three-judge court alleg-
ing that it discriminated against low income persons in Lawrence v. Oakes, 361 F.
Supp. 432 (D. Vt. 1973). See also James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (upholding
the validity of a California law subjecting low-rent public housing projects to referen-
dum); Acevedo v. Nassau County, 500 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1974) (a local government
has no statutory or constitutional duty to follow through with construction of low
income housing)..
* Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976). In affirming metropolitan-wide relief
to remedy discrimination in site selection of HUD-funded public housing, the Supreme
Court discussed the potential impact of HAP's.
As stated in a report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, in the
HCDA:
for the first time ties the provision of community development funds to the
provision of lower-income housing by requiring each locality to submit a
housing assistance plan as part of its community development block grant
application. To receive community development funding, a locality must
address its need for lower-income housing.
UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CivIL RIGHTS, TWENTY YEARS AFRE BROWN: Equal Op-
portunity in Housing 32 (December 1975) (footnotes omitted). See also City of Hart-
ford v. Hills, 408 F. Supp. 889, 898 (D. Conn. 1976), reversed on standing sub nom.
City of Hartford v. Town of Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1977); Franklin, Open
Communities Litigation and the Housing Community Development Act of 1974, in
NATIONAL COMMITrEE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, ExcLusIoNARY LAND USE
LITIGATION, POLICY AND STRATEGY FOR THE FUTURE (1975).
11 24 C.F.R. § 570.303 (1977). The regulations require a community to identify
housing needs by type of tenant or owner, such as family, elderly or handicapped, or
large family. This must be accompanied by an assistance plan which is roughly propor-
tional to the recipient's needs.
42 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(4)(A) (Supp. V 1975). Those expected to reside are defined
in 24 C.F.R. § 570.303(c)(2)(i)-(ii) (1977) as "families with workers expected to be
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"expected to reside" provision is the mechanism for achieving
the HCDA objective of "spatial deconcentration of housing
opportunities for persons of lower income" in suburban areas.,3
In addition to stating the needs for low cost housing assis-
tance, the HAP must specify goals for low cost housing units."
According to the regulations, the goals must proportionally
"address the needs of the three household types (elderly and/or
handicapped, families, and large families).""5 Also, locations
must be identified for newly constructed and substantially re-
habilitated housing units to be assisted. The locations must be
accessible to public services, further the goals of revitalizing
neighborhoods and avoid "undue concentrations of assisted
persons in areas containing a high proportion of low-income
persons.""
In reviewing the HAP component in a community develop-
ment block grant application, HUD must approve the applica-
tion unless it finds that the applicant's description of housing
needs and objectives is "plainly inconsistent" with generally
available facts and data or that it conflicts with the require-
employed in the community, but living elsewhere, who could be reasonably expected
to reside in the community if housing they could afford were available." The estimates
must be based on federal census data and other data which is generally available. Id.
The estimate of "families with workers already employed in the community, but living
elsewhere who could reasonably be expected to reside in the community" is computed
using a formula based on the "overall metropolitan area percentage of lower-income
families with workers who live in the same community in which they work." Id. The
current design of the HAP has been criticized in an interim report evaluating the
process because information on overcrowding and on families paying an excessive
portion of their income for rent is omitted. 4 Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 989 (1977).
City of Hartford v. Hills, 408 F. Supp. 889, 901-02 (D. Conn. 1976), reversed on
standing sub nom. City of Hartford v. Town of Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir.
1977). In this case suburban towns around Hartford, Connecticut were permanently
enjoined from spending their community development grants because they failed to
prepare HAP's which adequately addressed regional and local housing needs. HUD
had approved HAP's in six of the suburban towns which listed the "expected to reside"
figure at zero. It is noteworthy that the plurality opinion questioned the importance
of the "expected to reside" figure in the specific factual context of the Hills case. See
Kushner, supra note 51 at 64-65 for a further discussion of the Hills case.
" 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(4)(B) (Supp. V 1975) states that a HAP must "[specify]
a realistic annual goal for the number of dwelling units or persons to be assisted,
including (i) the relative proportion of new, rehabilitated, and existing dwelling units,
and (ii) the sizes and types of housing projects and assistance best suited to the needs
of lower-income persons in the community .... " See also 24 C.F.R. § 570.303(c)(3)
(1977).
(7 24 C.F.R. § 570.303(c)(3)(iv) (1977).
" 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(4)(C) (Supp. V 1975); 24 C.F.R. § 570.303(c)(4)(ii) (1977).
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ments of the HCDA or other applicable law.67 Thus, in City of
Hartford v. Hills,"5 the court held that HUD had acted arbitrar-
ily in approving a community development application where
housing needs identified in the HAP were "plainly inconsist-
ent" with generally available facts and data.69 Even if the ap-
plicant adequately assesses housing needs in the HAP, the
goals may be "plainly inappropriate to meet needs" and, there-
fore, subject to rejection by HUD. 0 In HUD's review of the
HAP, the locations of proposed housing for lower income per-
sons must also be considered. 1
The manner in which HUD enforces the HAP require-
ments will play an important role in the location of newly con-
structed and substantially rehabilitated section 8 housing.72 In
the event that HUD fails to enforce its regulations relating to
approval of HAP's, administrative and judicial challenges
exist.73 For example, to the extent that central cities rely on
67 42 U.S.C. § 5304(c) (Supp. V 1975); 24 C.F.R. § 570.306(b)(2)(i) (1977).
61 408 F. Supp. 889 (D. Conn. 1976), reversed on standing sub. nom. City of
Hartford v. Town of Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1977).
1, Id. at 902-07. See note 63 supra and accompanying text for additional discussion
of this case.
70 42 U.S.C. § 5304(c)(2) (Supp. V 1975); 24 C.F.R. § 570.306(b)(2) (1977). See
also City of Hartford v. Hills, 408 F. Supp. 889, 902 n.56 (D. Conn. 1976). For example,
HUD disapproved the HCDA application of Parma, Ohio, in which the HAP showed
1,537 households in need of housing assistance and an annual goal of zero. 3 Hous. &
DEv. REP. (BNA) 69 (1975). See 24 C.F.R. § 570.303(c)(3)(v) (1977).
HUD regulations require that goals be proportional to needs. For example, where
70% of a community's housing need is for families, HUD will allow a goal of no less
than 60% (with exceptions for special circumstances). 24 C.F.R. § 570.303(c)(3)(iv)
(1977). But see NAACP v. Hills, 412 F. Supp. 102, 110-11 (N.D. Cal. 1976), in which
HUD's approval of a HAP with larger variations was upheld. Compliance with the
regulations was not addressed. See also Kushner, supra note 51, at 70-71.
1, See note 66 supra and accompanying text. Section 8 and substantially rehabili-
tated housing must conform with the site standards in the regulations. See notes 46-
48 supra and accompanying text for site selection requirements.
72 According to a study by the GAO, HUD approved two community development
block grant applications in 1975, even though the HAP's were inadequate in terms of
assessing housing needs or setting realistic goals for assisted housing. The cities in-
volved were Midland, Tex., and Wayne, N.J. On the other hand, HUD rejected com-
munity development applications by Parma, Ohio, Bloomfield, N.J., and Maple
Shade, N.J., on the basis of inadequate HAP's. 4 Hous. & DEV. REP. (BNA) 68 (1976).
Subsequently, HUD has rejected applications by Pomona, Cal., St. Joseph, Mich.,
East Hartford, Conn., and Hightown, N.J., because of HAP violations. 5 Hous. & DEV.
REP. (BNA) 95 (1977).
- 24 C.F.R. § 570.306(b) (1977) alludes to the possibility of administrative com-
plaints during HUD's review of an application. In judicial review, the challenges will
be confronted with the Supreme Court's restrictive interpretation of standing in exclu-
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section 8 substantially rehabilitated housing as a mechanism
for addressing housing needs, the impact of the HAP on pro-
moting a greater choice of housing opportunities is proble-
matic.7 The HAP regulations require locations to be described
by census tract, but this does not necessarily disclose whether
the actual locations of housing will have the effect of increasing
racial or low income concentrations. 75 Of course, the proposed
section 8 housing assistance must also conform to the section
8 site selection regulations. In this regard, it is significant that
while the regulations seek to avoid the undue concentration of
low income persons,76 they do not prohibit substantially reha-
bilitated housing which contributes to racial concentrations.
Even if a HAP is facially adequate, it is possible that the
applicant, particularly a suburb, might not be able to imple-
ment the HAP goals under existing land use restrictions. For
example, exclusionary zoning in the form of large lot require-
ments or growth limitations based on the number of construc-
tion starts or phased growth programs could thwart a HAP goal
for low income housing. 7 Since the HCDA calls for a "realistic"
sionary land use cases. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). However, the Court
does recognize congressionally established standing. Id. at 501.
In City of Hartford v. Town of Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1032 (2nd Cir. 1977), rev'g
408 F. Supp. 889 (D. Conn. 1976), the court held that the city and low-income minority
plaintiffs did not have standing to enjoin HUD's approval of community development
applications of suburbs of Hartford. A majority of the court stated that the plaintiffs
could not benefit from the injunction sought since even if the suburbs altered their
applications to comply with HAP regulations, no additional funds were available for
housing in the suburbs. But see Knoxville Progressive Christians Coalition v. Tester-
man, 404 F. Supp. 783, 788 (E.D. Tenn. 1975). The court in NAACP v. Hills, 412 F.
Supp. 102, 106 (N.D. Cal. 1976), found that an association representing minorities and
persons of low income residing in the applicant community had standing. See generally
Kushner, supra note 51, at 62-80 for a discussion of judicial review and remedies
relating to HAP's.
7d See notes 92, 93 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of HAP's and the
central cities.
73 See 24 C.F.R. § 570.303(c)(4) (1977). See also Kushner, supra note 51, at 79-80.
1, Compare 24 C.F.R. § 881.112 (1977) with id. § 880.112. Another goal of the
HCDA is to restore and rehabilitate stable neighborhoods. This may require that some
§ 8 housing be located in areas of racial concentration. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301(c),
5304(a)(4)(c) (Supp. V 1975). However, if HUD were to permit a community to place
all § 8 housing in areas of racial concentration, federal civil rights legislation would be
violated. See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971); Shannon v.
HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970).
7 Such growth restrictions have been challenged under state and federal due
process and equal protection clauses, and under state zoning enabling laws. Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct. 55 (1977) holds that in order
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description of annual goals, HUD may be required to disap-
prove such an application.
78
Assuming that a HAP is adequate, HUD must monitor the
applicant's compliance with the HCDA in its use of community
development funds.79 Under regulations governing performance
standards for implementing HAP's, a community will be
judged to have met its one-year HAP goal if the units specified
in the HAP have received a firm commitment for financing
within two years. In addition, a community will be judged on
whether it took action to reach HAP goals, such as removing
zoning barriers to low cost housing, cooperating with public
housing authorities, and whether the housing assistance pro-
to establish that zoning regulations violate the equal protection clause, racially dis-
criminatory motive, as well as racially disproportionate impact must be shown. See
also Joseph Skillken & Co. v. City of Toledo, 528 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated,
426 U.S. 945 (1977), aff'd on rehearing, 558 F.2d. 350 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46
U.S.L.W. 3373 (1977); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970). Ass'n
v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
But see United States v. City of Blackjack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974); Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977); Resi-
dent Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, (3d Cir. 1977) (intent need not be shown
under 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1970)).
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713
(N.J.), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975), holds, based on state constitutional
grounds, that communities may not use zoning to exclude low income housing. Fur-
ther, these communities must affirmatively provide the opportunity for their fair share
of such housing. Accord, Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378
N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975); Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 341 A.2d 466
(Pa. 1975). Contra, Ybarra v. Town of Las Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974)
(upholding large lot zoning in the face of federal constitutional and statutory attack).
See also Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976) and Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d
291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1973) (upholding time
limitations on growth).
"1 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(4)(B) (Supp. V 1975). But see Johnson v. County of Ches-
ter, 413 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Pa. 1976) in which an injunction was sought barring a
community development grant to a township whose exclusionary zoning ordinance had
been declared unconstitutional. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. 99 1331, 1361 (1970). See Kushner, supra note 51, at 73-77 for a discussion of
the relation of restrictive land use practices with HAP's.
11 42 U.S.C. § 5311 (Supp. V 1975); 24 C.F.R. § 570.900 et seq. (1977). Annual
performance reports, including information on housing assistance provided, must be
submitted by recipients. Id. § 570.906 (1977). If deficiencies appear HUD must provide
the recipient with notice and an opportunity for a hearing. After the hearing, HUD
can terminate or reduce payments, or request the U.S. Attorney General to sue for
recovery of payments or injunctive relief. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5311(a)-(b) (Supp. V 1975); 24
C.F.R. § 570.913 (1977).
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vided conforms with the HAP. 80
Of course, in areas where communities do not apply for
community development grants, there will be no HAP. In such
a situation, proposals for newly constructed and substantially
rehabilitated section 8 housing would still have to be situated
so as to promote increased housing opportunities for low in-
come persons, as required by the site selection regulations for
section 8.1' However, the proposed sites would have to comply
with local zoning requirements.82 Such communities will not
have the pressure of the HAP to admit low cost housing within
their borders.3
B. Site Selection for Section 8 Existing Housing
There are no specific site selection provisions in the regula-
tions for the section 8 existing housing program.84 Persons who
obtain certification in this program are entitled to find suitable
housing in any area where the certifying public housing author-
ity is authorized to enter into housing assistance payments
contracts with landlords.15 This is the so-called "finders-
keepers" policy. The PHA cannot favor prospective section 8
residents of existing housing based on the location of the hous-
ing selected.86 Thus, even if there is full compliance with the
- 24 C.F.R. §§ 570.909(e)(2), (f)(2) (1977). See 4 Hous. & DEV. REP. (BNA) 804-
05 (1977). If a recipient's failure to implement its HAP is racially motivated, constitu-
tional and civil rights remedies, as well as the HUD noncompliance procedures, would
be available to compel compliance. See Kushner, supra note 51, at 86-87.
" See notes 46-49 supra and accompanying text for discussion of HUD site selec-
tion regulations.
24 C.F.R. § 880.209(a)(13) (1977); id. § 881.209(a)(16).
3 There is no requirement in the HCDA that an eligible community apply for
funds. City of Hartford v. Hills, 408 F. Supp. 889, 902 (D. Conn. 1976). However,
failure to apply for funds, along with other factors, could violate state and federal due
process and equal protection clauses and federal civil rights statutes. But see Mahaley
v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., 500 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1974). See also note 77 supra
and accompanying text and Kushner, supra note 51, at 77 n.173 regarding exclusionary
zoning.
- 24 C.F.R. Part 882 (1977); id. § 882.109(k).
u Id. § 882.103(a).
u Id. § 882.209(a)(2). However, the housing authority must implement an "equal
opportunity housing plan" including procedures for obtaining the participation of
landlords in areas outside low income and minority concentrations. Id. §
882.204(b)(I)(i)(B). It must also include certification of intent to "take affirmative
action to provide opportunities to participate in the program to persons expected to
reside in the locality because of present or planned employment as indicated in the
[applicable] Housing Assistance Plan." Id. § 882.204(b)(1)(iii).
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regulations, there is no assurance that the existing housing
program will deconcentrate low income persons, even though
theoretically families participating in the program can take
their certificates anywhere within the local authority's terri-
tory. 7 Any failure of the existing housing program to disperse
housing opportunities may be aggravated by the "rent reduc-
tion incentive" aspect of the program. Under the "rent reduc-
tion incentive," if a family selects a unit where the rent is below
the applicable fair market rent or other applicable maximum,
the family's share of the rent is reduced.88 This may tend to
encourage families participating in the program to choose
housing in low cost housing areas.8 Another factor working
against deconcentration is the desire of recipients of section 8
certificates to remain in minority or low income areas because
of racial, ethnic, family or religious ties."
In order to become a certifying agent for the § 8 existing housing program in its
jurisdiction, a local housing authority must demonstrate that its proposal is consistent
with applicable HAP goals. Id. § 882.204(a)(3). See note 57 supra and accompanying
text. If a local housing authority does not qualify as a certifying agent, HUD may
assume that function. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975); 24 C.F.R. § 882.121(b)
(1977).
81 A preliminary report by HUD's Office of Policy Development and Research
shows that the existing housing program is not causing widespread dispersion of low
income families. The findings were based on preliminary studies of 50 local housing
authorities around the country. A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY, supra note 2, at 21-23.
24 C.F.R. § 882.115 (1977).
go See GAO REPORT, supra note 31, at 48-49. See also paragraph 18 of the preamble
to the final HUD Regulations, 24 C.F.R. Part 882 (1977).
"1 A REPORr TO THE SECRETARY, supra note 2, at 22; GAO REPORT, supra note 31,
at 43. Other factors preventing deconcentration include low fair market rents limiting
choice to low income areas; geographical limits due to regulations restricting a partici-
pant's shopping range to the geographical jurisdiction of the certifying PHA (24 C.F.R.
§ 882.103 (1977)); and PHA-imposed residency requirements on applicants seeking
eligibility certification. A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY, supra note 2 at 21-22; GAO RE-
PORT, supra note 31, at 42-45. Another factor is extensive use of the § 8 loan manage-
ment program which ties subsidies to specific projects with HUD-insured mortgages.
GAO REPORT, supra note 31, at 50-54.
A comparison to the results of the § 23 leased housing program is instructive since
that program involved a situation in which PHA's provided units to low income ten-
ants'which were leased from private landlords. 42 U.S.C. § 1421b (1970 and Supp. V
1975). A goal of that program was to foster racial and economic mixes in communities.
See H.R. REP. No. 365, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-15, reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 23-28. Between 1965 and 1974 under the § 23 program, 150,000 units
were leased: S. REP. No. 693, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 43 reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4273. It has been reported that § 23 had not been successful in
achieving substantial economic and racial integration. Friedman & Krier, A New
Lease on Life: Section 23 Housing and the Poor, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 611, 616-26 (1968).
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In areas where there are HAP's any failure of the existing
housing program to promote increased housing opportunities
could undermine that objective of the program and the
HCDA.1' This is due to the fact that HAP's must use the exist-
ing and substantial rehabilitation programs except in unusual
circumstances.2 This consideration is particularly relevant to
central cities which may rely on section 8 substantially rehabil-
itated housing, which is likely to be located in economically or
racially impacted areas, and on section 8 existing housing. 3
II. EVICTIONS UNDER THE SECTION 8 PROGRAM
Every tenant who is required to move by his landlord in-
curs costs and suffers inconvenience. This burden is particu-
larly great on low income tenants of government subsidized
housing. It is unlikely that such persons will be able to find
decent housing in the private market at affordable rents. Fur-
thermore, the threat of eviction can be used by a landlord, with
varying degrees of subtlety, to discourage tenants from resist-
ing objectionable management practices such as inadequate
maintenance and unreasonable charges for damages or late
rent." Therefore, protecting tenants from arbitrary evictions is
an important issue in the section 8 housing program.
See also, Palmer, Section 23 Housing: Low-Rent Housing in Private Accommodations,
48 J. Uiw. L. 255 (1971). Factors which may have limited the program's use include
the requirement of local approval, 42 U.S.C. § 1421b(a)(2) (1970 and Supp. V 1975);
the restriction on § 23 in areas in which the vacancy rate for comparable units was
less than 3% and finally, the provision that § 23 would be funded only if the cost was
less than that for construction of conventional public housing units. 42 U.S.C. §§
1421b(a)(1), (e) (1970 and Supp. V 1975). See Leased Housing Program, supra note 2,
at 1158-65.
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437f(a), 5301(c)(6) (Supp. V 1975).
,2 24 C.F.R. § 570.303(c) (1977). Section 8 new construction may be approved if
there is a low rental housing vacancy rate, if a community can demonstrate that
available housing assistance resources cannot be used in programs using the existing
housing stock, or if the housing assistance needs of one or more household types cannot
be met by programs using the existing housing stock.
," Substantially rehabilitated § 8 housing must be located so as to avoid undue
concentrations of low income persons. 24 C.F.R. § 881.112(c) (1977). See notes 46-49,
74-76 supra and accompanying text. It may be that a central city HAP which relies
almost exclusively on § 8 existing housing may violate the HCDA goal of promoting
greater choice of housing opportunities and avoiding undue concentrations of assisted
persons in low income areas. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301(c)(6), 5304(a)(4)(c) (Supp. V 1975).
Depending on the racial intent or effect, such a situation might also violate federal civil
rights statutes. See Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3rd Cir. 1970).
" Leased Housing Program, supra note 2, at 1174 n.145.
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A. The Eviction Process
The eviction procedure under section 8 varies with the
type of housing involved (existing, substantially rehabilitated
or newly constructed), the identity of the owner, and the source
of financing. The most extensive procedure among the various
section 8 programs is the one applicable to existing housing
with HUD-insured and HUD-held mortgages and newly con-
structed or substantially rehabilitated housing which has been
financed under section 202 of the National Housing Act of
1959.15
In regard to the regular section 8 existing housing program
the HDCA provides that the PHA has "the sole right to give
notice to vacate, with the owner having the right to make repre-
sentation to the agency for termination of tenancy."96 The ex-
isting housing regulations state that all evictions must be au-
thorized by the PHA and the owner cannot evict any family
unless he complies with local law and the regulations.97 Written
notice of the proposed eviction must be given by the landlord.
11 HUD has issued regulations governing evictions from certain subsidized and
HUD owned projects, including certain § 8 housing. 24 C.F.R. § 450.2 (1977). A signifi-
cant portion of § 8 existing housing under the loan management "Additional Assis-
tance Program" is covered by the eviction regulations. See note 41 supra. The propor-
tion of newly constructed and substantially rehabilitated § 8 housing under § 202, a
program for elderly housing, is also large. See note 41 supra. See also 5 Hous. & DEv.
REP. (BNA) 49 (1977). According to these regulations, landlords may not terminate any
tenancy except upon a material noncompliance with the lease, a material failure to
carry out any tenant obligations under the appropriate state landlord-tenant statute,
and upon other good cause. 24 C.F.R. §§ 450.2, .3 (1977). In addition, no termination
is valid to the extent that it is based upon a lease or state law allowing termination
without good cause. Id. Evictions based upon the "good cause" provision must be
preceded by prior notice to the tenant of the conduct constituting the basis for the
termination. Id. § 450.4. A prerequisite to any termination is a written statement that
must include the date of termination, the specific reasons for the landlord's action, and
advice to the tenant of his right to present a defense in any court proceeding. Id. Strict
service requirements are also included in the HUD regulation.
The regulations are HUD's response to cases such as Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236
(4th Cir. 1973), and Anderson v. Denny, 365 F. Supp. 1254 (W.D. Va. 1973). The
regulations are based on the assumption that tenants would receive a due process
hearing in state court. 41 Fed. Reg. 43,330-1 (1976).
" 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1975).
'v 24 C.F.R. § 882.215 (1977). This eviction procedure must be set out in the lease.
Id. § 882.210(f)(2). Certain lease terms, such as confessions of judgment, waivers of
prior notice to actions for eviction or money, and waivers of rights to jury trial are
prohibited. Id. § 882.210(0(3). A similar prohibition applies to such lease clauses in
the new construction program. Id. § 880.219(c).
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The notice must contain the grounds and advise the family
that it has ten days to respond to an eviction notice." A copy
of this notice must be provided to the PHA which, in turn, has
twenty days from the date on which the family received the
notice to examine the grounds. Unless the PHA determines
that the grounds are insufficient under the lease, it must au-
thorize the eviction." Noticeably absent from the regular exist-
ing housing regulations (and present in the HUD-insured and
HUD-financed existing housing units regulations) is an express
"good cause" requirement or a requirement that a tenant's
non-compliance with the lease be material. If the landlord has
complied with the lease and local laws, the regulations appear
to require the PHA to authorize the eviction.
The most permissive eviction procedure is in newly con-
structed and substantially rehabilitated housing which is not
financed under the section 202 program.' °° The HDCA and the
HUD regulations simply provide that the owner is responsible
for termination of tenancies, including evictions.'"' No PHA
authorization is required; whatever eviction procedure exists in
the private market will apply. There is one exception when the
owner seeks housing assistance payments during the time the
unit is vacant as a result of eviction. The regulations allow the
owner of a vacant unit to receive eighty percent of the contract
rent for a vacancy period not exceeding sixty days.0 2 To be
eligible for this assistance the owner must certify that he gave
the evicted family a written notice of the proposed eviction
stating the grounds and that the family was allowed to present
objections to the owner within ten days of the notification. In
addition, the owner must certify that the eviction did not vio-
late the lease, contract or any applicable law.' 3 If the owner
does not seek housing assistance payments during a vacancy,
" Id. § 882.215.
"Id.
IS See note 95 supra and accompanying text for HUD regulations regarding evic-
tions. An exception exists with respect to newly constructed and substantially rehabili-
tated housing which is owned by PHA's. In those cases, the grievance and lease require-
ments (24 C.F.R. Part 866 (1977)) generally associated with the conventional public
housing program apply. Id. § 880.226. See note 106 infra for further discussion.
202 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(e)(2) (Supp. V 1975); 24 C.F.R. § 880.220 (1977).
102 24 C.F.R. § 880.107(c)(l)-(2) (1977). See note 21 supra for a discussion of these
regulations.
10 Id.
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these certification requirements do not apply. If the number of
eligible families exceeds the number of available units, it is
unlikely that many owners will need to avail themselves of this
subsidy. Even if they do, the tenant's right to object to the
owner has limited value. Furthermore, the regulations do not
provide for regular monitoring of the owner's certification of
compliance with the lease and local laws."0 4 Certainly an
evicted tenant is not in a position to know if his landlord will
request continued assistance payments and whether the land-
lord complies with procedures since there is no requirement
that the procedures appear in the lease.' 5
While there are some differences in the eviction procedures
for the various section 8 programs, there is a common element
that permeates all of them: the relative lack of protection given
the tenants who occupy these government-subsidized pro-
jects.' 6 This lack of protection is most serious in the newly
'4 According to the housing assistance payments contracts, HUD reviews owners'
requests for assistance payments. HUD Processing Handbook 7420.1, formerly 24
C.F.R. § 880, app. 11, § 1.9F (1976).
"' See Leased Housing Program, supra note 2, at 1178 nn.172-73.
,01 HUD has recently promulgated regulations regarding lease requirements for
conventional public housing projects and grievance procedures for public housing ten-
ants. 24 C.F.R. Part 866 (1977). These regulations supercede HUD circular RHM
7465.8 (Feb. 22, 1971), HUD circular RHM 7465.9 (Feb. 22, 1971), and the Proposed
Dwelling Lease Grievance Procedures, 39 Fed. Reg. 39,287 (1974). Subpart A of the
regulations outlines various required and prohibited provisions for dwelling leases
issued by all PHA's. With regard to termination of leases, the regulations require that
the PHA give 14 days notice in nonpayment of rent cases unless there exists a threat
to health or safety of other tenants in which case the notice must be given within "a
reasonable time commensurate with the exigencies" of the case. 24 C.F.R. §
866.4(1),(2) (1977). In all other cases, 30 days notice is required. Id. The regulations
further require that the notice of termination state the reasons for the termination and
inform the tenant of his right to make a reply and to request a hearing in accordance
with the grievance procedure in subpart B of Part 866. Id. § 866.4(1),(3).
The grievance procedures afford PHA tenants "an opportunity for a hearing if the
tenant disputes. . . any PHA action or failure to act involving the tenant's lease with
the PHA or PHA regulations which adversely affect the individual tenant's rights,
duties, welfare or status." Id. § 866.50 (emphasis added). To receive a hearing, the
tenant must present the grievance to the PHA or to the project office either orally or
in writing. This will invoke an informal discussion, analogous to a pretrial conference,
after which a summary is prepared and sent to the tenant. The summary must also
apprise the tenants of the procedures by which a hearing may be obtained. Id. § 866.54.
To receive a hearing the tenant must request it in writing, along with the reasons for
the grievance and the relief sought. Id. § 866.55(a). The regulations provide the tenant
with a Goldberg v. Kelly (see note 120 infra and accompanying text) administrative
hearing. Id. §§ 866.53(c), .56 and .57. The PHA is required to await the decision of
the hearing panel before it serves a notice to vacate and proceeds to commence an
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constructed and substantially rehabilitated programs without
financing under section 202 in which the tenant may object
only to the owner himself, rather than to the PHA, as in the
existing program. HUD's rationale for this policy is that Con-
gress felt that "the Section 8 program can serve the nation best
by vesting in private owners the fullest measure of manage-
ment responsibilities.""1 ' A similar justification was given by
HUD for the regular existing housing program where the pro-
tection to the tenant is much less than that provided tenants
of conventional public housing108 or other subsidized units."9 In
excluding these families from coverage under the eviction regu-
lations for other ubsidized and HUD-owned projects, HUD
also rationalized that the regular existing housing program is
premised on the "finders-keepers" concept where eligible fami-
lies are issued a certificate of family participation which ena-
bles them to shop for acceptable housing among the eligible
owners. If evicted, the family is free to find another dwelling
eviction action in the state or local court. Id. § 866.58.
One important change of policy by HUD in its implementation of 24 C.F.R. Part
866 pertains to the right of the PHA to exclude particular evictions or terminations
from its grievance procedure. The proposed regulations allowed the PHA to waive the
procedure in nonpayment of rent cases and in cases involving a threat to the health
and safety of PHA tenants or employees if the local courts would provide a due process
hearing on the merits. 39 Fed. Reg. 39,288 (1974). The new regulations retained the
waiver only with regard to the health and safety provision in 24 C.F.R. § 866.51(a)
(1977). HUD apparently decided not to allow the waiver in nonpayment cases in any
instance.
"' Preamble to 24 C.F.R. Part 450 (1977). The HCDA states at 42 U.S.C. §
1437f(e)(2) (Supp. V 1975): "The contract between the Secretary and the owner with
respect to newly constructed or substantially rehabilitated dwelling units shall provide
that all ownership, management, and maintenance responsibilities, including the
selection of tenants and the termination of tenancy, shall be assumed by the owner
. ." See note 100 supra and accompanying text regarding exceptions which apply
when the units are owned by a PHA or a private owner financing under § 202 of the
National Housing Act of 1959.
'- 24 C.F.R. § 886.50-.59 (1977). See note 106 supra for a discussion of termination
procedures.
"1, 24 C.F.R. Part 450 (1977). This regulation applies to § 8 housing projects that
have HUD-insured or HUD-held mortgages. Id. § 450.2(e). Fifty to sixty percent of §
8 newly constructed and substantially rehabilitated starts have been financed with
FHA insurance. 5 Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 49 (1977). For a description of the proce-
dures under 24 C.F.R. Part 450, see note 95 supra. The regulations are based in part
on cases such as Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973), and Anderson v. Denny,
365 F. Supp. 1254 (W.D. Va. 1973). See also Note, Procedural Due Process in
Government-Subsidized Housing, 86 HARv. L. REv. 880, 903-10 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Due Process in Subsidized Housing].
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unit and continue to receive the benefit of the certificate."0 To
the extent that the number of available existing units is less
than the number of families looking for housing, reliance upon
the "finders-keepers" concept is misplaced."'
Unlike the newly constructed and substantially rehabili-
tated programs, however, the regular existing housing program
does afford the tenant the opportunity to object to the evic-
tion with the PHA. But without a "good cause" requirement
or similar prerequisite to eviction, a tenant's ability to contest
capricious actions by landlords is limited. In addition, except
in the case of PHA-owned newly constructed or substanti-
ally rehabilitated units, the section 8 programs do not provide
even a semblance of a "prior oral hearing" to tenants facing
eviction. HUD expressly excluded the section 8 program from
coverage under the model lease and grievance procedure."1
2
Thus, the objecting tenant has no express statutory right to
examine pertinent records and documents relating to the ten-
ancy; he has no right to even an informal hearing at which he
can rebut evidence against him, cross-examine the owner, and
examine other witnesses; and he has no right to an eviction
decision based on stated reasons and findings of fact."' Unlike
the tenant in conventional public housing, the section 8 tenant
will not be able to receive a hearing until and unless he decides
to avail himself of whatever judicial proceedings may exist., 4
Consequently, the section 8 programs appear to be susceptible
to arbitrary eviction by landlords.
,, Preamble to 24 C.F.R. Part 450 (1977).
"' See A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY, supra note 2, at 24-26.
112 24 C.F.R. § 882.216 (1977) (existing housing); id. § 880.226 (new construction).
See note 100 supra for the sole exception.
,,3 See notes 98 and 99 supra and accompanying text regarding the eviction pro-
cess from § 8 existing housing.
"I Good cause need not be shown for failure to renew a tenancy after the expira-
tion of a lease term on the private market. See, e.g., CAL. Cw. PROC. CODE § 1161.1
(West 1976); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 45-901 (West 1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.58 (West
Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 562.6, 648.1(2) (West 1950); MICH. COMP.LAWS ANN.
§ 600.5714(1)(b)(ii) (Supp. 1977-78); Miss. CODE ANN. § 89-7-23 (1972); N.Y. REAL
PROP. LAW § 232-c (McKinney 1968); N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTS. § 711.1 (McKinney 1968);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.04(A)(4) (Page Supp. 1976).
330 , [Vol. 66
LEASED HOUSING PROGRAM
B. Application of Due Process Requirements to the Section 8
Eviction Procedure
The important question concerning the section 8 eviction
regulations is whether they violate procedural due process
under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution. As early as 1955, a lower federal court
recognized that the government acting as a landlord "must not
act arbitrarily, for, unlike private landlords, it is subject to the
requirements of due process of law. 115 It took almost fifteen
more years for a federal court to hold that public housing ten-
ants must be given due process safeguards before their eviction
by a housing authority.1 ' Further light was shed in the area of
procedural due process in the following year when the Supreme
Court decided Goldberg v. Kelly, "I a case involving suspension
of public assistance benefits. In Goldberg, the Court held that
public assistance could not be terminated without a prior due
process hearing. The Court recognized that welfare benefits
were a "matter of statutory entitlement" the termination of
which amounts to state action that "adjudicates important
rights."'1 The Court defined the requisite safeguards needed to
satisfy due process by balancing the governmental interest in
summary adjudication with the recipients' interest in avoiding
"grievous loss.""' 9 After applying this balancing test, the Court
held that the recipients' interest outweighed any governmental
need to minimize the administrative burden of pretermination
hearings. The Court held that due process required notice of
proposed action as well as the reasons for it; an administrative
hearing at which the recipient, with counsel, could argue his
case and examine and cross-examine witnesses before an im-
partial decisionmaker; and a decision based solely on the facts
presented at the hearing which states both the findings of fact
and reasons underlying them. 2'
-s Rudder v. United States, 226 F.2d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
I Ruffin v. Hous. Auth., 301 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. La. 1969).
117 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See Leased Housing Program, supra note 2, at 1180-81 for
a discussion of due process in government housing programs prior to Goldberg.
397 U.S. at 262.
" Id. at 262-63. Citing Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union Local 473 v. McEl-
roy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961), the Court recognized the necessity of identifying "the precise
nature of the governmental function involved as well as of the private interest." Id. at
263.
1'2 Id. at 266-71.
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Shortly after the Goldberg decision, two circuit courts ap-
plied Goldberg to evictions in conventional public housing.1 2
Shortly thereafter, federal courts included privately-owned
subsidized projects within the Goldberg rule.12 2 The question is
whether the section 8 program, with its emphasis and depend-
ence on purely private ownership, is distinguishable from these
statutory programs. To determine the extent of the procedural
safeguards due section 8 tenants, a careful examination of the
program is required in light of the constitutional standards set
down by the Court in Goldberg and later cases.
In the past decade the Supreme Court has established a
three-part test to analyze claims for procedural due process.
First, there must be either state or federal government action
sufficient to invoke the principles of due process. ' Second, the
claimant must show that the interest sought to be protected is
a property or liberty interest within the scope of the due process
clause. 124 Third, the private interest sought to be protected
must be balanced against the competing government interest
to determine what procedures are required to satisfy due pro-
cess.12s In the following sections each of these three elements
will be analyzed and applied to the section 8 eviction process.
"I Caulder v. Durham Hous. Auth., 433 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 1003 (1971); Escalera v. New York City of Hous. Auth., 435 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970).
'" See, e.g., Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973); Anderson v. Denny, 365
F. Supp. 1254 (W.D. Va. 1973); Due Process in Subsidized Housing, supra note 109,
at 903-10.
2 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1975); Joy v. Daniels,
479 F.2d 1236, 1238-39 (4th Cir. 1973).
,21 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-603 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 569-72 (1972).
12 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Geneva Towers Tenants Organiza-
tion v. Federated Mortgage Investors, 504 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1974). In Eldridge, the
Court held that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of social
security disability payments. The Court stated that three factors must be considered
in resolving the constitutional (due process) sufficiency of the Social Security Adminis-
tration procedures prior to the initial termination of benefits:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.
424 U.S. at 335. The key factor in Eldridge was the existence of "an effective process
for asserting [the recipients'] claim prior to any administrative action . . . [and the]
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1. Government Action in Section 8
Due process under the fifth or fourteenth amendments
does not apply to purely private behavior; there must be fed-
eral or state governmental action. 26 The Supreme Court has
never established an absolute test for determining whether a
private person's conduct has been so intertwined with the gov-
ernment that it constitutes "government action." Rather, the
Court has stated that "[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing
circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the state in
private conduct be attributed its true significance. 112 7 In its
most recent decision involving the test of state action, Jackson
v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 2 the Court again emphasized that
"the question whether particular conduct is 'private,' on the
one hand, or 'state action' on the other, frequently admits of
no easy answer.1' 29 Although the Supreme Court never passed
on the question, there is little dispute that the due process
clause does apply to the eviction process in conventional public
housing.'30 Likewise many lower federal courts have found a
sufficient relationship between the government and the private
landlords of federally subsidized projects to invoke the require-
ments of procedural due process.'3' In finding government ac-
right to an evidentiary hearing, as well as to subsequent judicial review, before the
denial of [the] claim becomes final." Id. at 349. See also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134, 166-68 (1974); Morrisey v. Brewer, 409 U.S. 471 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 263-71 (1970); and notes 90-91 supra and accompanying text.
I2 The test of federal action under the fifth amendment is the same as the state
action requirements under the fourteenth amendment. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 169 (1970) (state action); Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451,
461-62 (1952) (federal action); Geneva Towers Tenants Organization v. Federated
Mortgage Investors, 504 F.2d 483, 487 (9th Cir. 1974).
I" Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972); Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
"' 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
' Id. at 349-50.
"' Caulder v. Durham Hous. Auth., 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 1003 (1071); Escalera v. New York City Hous. Auth., 435 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970).
"I See Geneva Towers Tenants Organization v. Federated Mortgage Investors, 504
F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1974); Lopez v. Henry Phipps Plaza South, Inc., 498 F.2d 937 (2d
Cir. 1974); Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973); Male v. Crossroads Ass'n, 469
F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1972); Prevo v. National Corp. in Hous. Partnerships, No. C-76-104A
(N.D. Ohio, E. Div. injunction filed June 3, 1976); Short v. Fulton Dev. Co., 390 F.
Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Anderson v. Denny, 365 F. Supp. 1254 (W. D. Va. 1973);
McClellan v. University Heights, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 374 (D.R.I. 1972); McQueen v.
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tion in evictions from subsidized housing, the courts have re-
lied upon the following factors: local approval; use of judicial
process; receipt of federal assistance to subsidize the rental and
mortgage payments; supervision of the project by the PHA or
HUD; and the regulatory agreement between HUD and the
landlord. Most of these cases, however, were decided prior to
Jackson.
In Jackson the Court held that where a heavily regulated
utility company with a territorial monopoly in supplying elec-
tricity terminates a customer's service for non-payment, the
termination does not constitute state action. The case pre-
sented many facets of the state action doctrine, and the major-
ity in Jackson considered these various aspects seriatim. First,
the Court found that it was doubtful that the state ever granted
defendant a monopoly, and in any event there was an
"insufficient relationship between the challenged actions of the
defendant and their monopoly status." ' 2 Second, the Court
determined that the provision of electricity was not a "public
function" because it was not among "the powers traditionally
exclusively reserved to the State." '33 The Court next considered
plaintiffs argument that defendant specifically authorized and
approved the termination practice. It found that the termina-
tion procedure had appeared in many previously filed tariffs
and had never been the "subject of a hearing or other scrutiny
by the Commission." Accordingly the Court determined that
the defendant never "put its own weight on the side of the
proposed practice by ordering it" and thus this practice was not
"transmuted" into state action.1 34 Finally, the Court did not
find the "symbiotic relationship"'35 that was present in Burton
v. Wilmington Parking Authority.'13 The Court distinguished
Druker, 317 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Mass. 1970); and Green v. Cooperstone, 346 A.2d 686
(Md. 1975). Prevo involved the eviction procedures of a § 236 landlord. Relying on the
prior decisions in Joy, McQueen, and Lopez, the court held that a privately-owned
apartment complex was subject to the standards of due process because it received
substantial federal benefits and was subjected to comprehensive HUD regulations. The
significance of Prevo is that it was decided after Jackson. See also Due Process in
Subsidized Housing, supra note 109.
132 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974).
133 Id.
' Id. at 354-55, 357.
23 Id. at 357.
131 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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Burton since Metropolitan Edison was a privately-owned cor-
poration, it did not lease its facilities from the state, and it
alone was responsible for providing power to its customers.
Even though defendant was subject to extensive regulation by
the state, the Court held that the state was not "a joint ven-
turer or partner in the challenged activity. '
' 3
7
To determine whether the proposed eviction of a section 8
tenant is government action, the section 8 program must be
analyzed in light of the Jackson and Burton cases and other
Supreme Court decisions involving the elusive concept of state
or government action.
The HCDA clearly states that the PHA or the equivalent
has the sole right to terminate the tenancy in the regular exist-
ing housing program. 3' The HCDA also recognizes that the
PHA is a governmental entity'39 and the courts have consis-
tently held that PHA activities are subject to the standards of
the fourteenth amendment.' Thus, it seems clear that even
under Jackson, the proposed eviction of a tenant in the section
8 existing housing program constitutes "state action."' 4
Unlike the existing housing program, eviction from newly
constructed and substantially rehabilitated housing is gener-
ally not subject to PHA approval. Section 8(e) (2) of the HCDA
gives the owner authority to terminate tenancies in these pro-
grams.4 2 Assuming that the owner is a private entity without
PHA sponsorship4 3 and that he has not contracted with a PHA
to provide management services,'44 it will be difficult to show
that proposed evictions constitute governmental action after
Jackson. However, in spite of HUD's obvious intent to vest as
much control and authority as possible in the private owner
seeking.to evict a tenant, there are several aspects of the newly
1- 419 U.S. 345, 358 (1974), quoting Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163,
176-77 (1972).
I's 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1975). See also 24 C.F.R. § 882.215 (1977).
I' 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(6) (Supp. V 1975).
110 See, e.g., Burr v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 479 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir. 1973);
Ruffin v. Hous. Auth., 301 F. Supp. 251 (E.D. La. 1969).
", See Leased Housing Program, supra note 2, at 1183.
' 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(e)(2) (Supp. V 1975); 24 C.F.R. § 880.220 (1977). But see id.
§ 880.107(c).
"' The regulations also contemplate ownership by a PHA and by a private owner
with PHA sponsorship. 24 C.F.R. § 880.102 (1977).
"I Id. § 880.119(b).
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constructed and substantially rehabilitated programs that
could support a finding of federal governmental action.1 5
The federal government is very involved in the section 8
newly constructed and substantially rehabilitated programs.
Eligibility for federal subsidies is the main incentive for con-
struction or rehabilitation of assisted units.'46 Through sub-
stantial federal subsidies and pervasive HUD regulations, it
appears that even under Jackson there may be a "symbiotic
relationship" between the private owner and HUD. Notwith-
standing the extensive regulation and subsidies, HUD has
adopted a "hands off' position on evictions from newly con-
structed and substantially rehabilitated housing. In effect
HUD has stated that evictions are not subject to HUD con-
trol.'47 It is arguable that by expressly relinquishing the evic-
tion decision to private owners, HUD has "insinuated itself-
into a position of interdependence with the eviction process
of the Section 8 landlord."'4
"I A similar conclusion is reached in Leased Housing Program, supra note 2, at
1185. It is unlikely that there would be a finding of state action, unless perhaps the §
8 housing is part of an urban renewal project. See Leased Housing Program, supra note
2, at 1184-85 nn.202 & 204. In such a situation a "symbiotic relationship" between state
government and the private owner may exist.
' The regulations provide several financial benefits to private owners. For in-
stance, the owner may be entitled to financing from a conventional lender utilizing
HUD-FHA mortgage insurance concurrently processed with his § 8 application. Fi-
nancing may be available from state housing finance agencies, the § 202 elderly pro-
gram, the Farmer's Home Administration or from PHA's themselves, acting as direct
lenders. 24 C.F.R. § 880.115(a) (1977). In addition, the owner is awarded a rent subsidy
in the form of housing assistance payments pursuant to a housing assistance payments
contract. Under this arrangement the owner receives from HUD the difference between
the tenant's rent (15-25% of the tenant's annual income) and the contract rent which
is based on fair rental value set by HUD. See notes 11, 32-37 supra and accompanying
text. The HUD portion (housing assistance payments) is paid to the owner.
Receipt of these two benefits, financing and housing assistance payments, is con-
ditioned upon the owner's compliance with a myriad of regulations imposed by HUD.
These regulations give HUD extensive control of the location, 24 C.F.R. § 880.212
(1977); maintenance, id. § 880.221; and management of the projects, id. §§ 880.212,
.223. The regulations dictate some lease provisions and outlaw others. Id. § 880.219.
HUD is expected to monitor the assisted units to insure owner compliance with the
regulations. Id. § 880.228. But see Weigand v. Afton View Apts., 473 F.2d 545 (8th Cir.
1973) (receipt of financial benefits alone is not a basis for finding government action).
" 24 C.F.R. § 880.220 (1977).
I" Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961). In Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) and Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407
U.S. 163 (1972), the Court refused to find a "symbiotic relationship" despite detailed
and extensive state regulation due to a lack of connection between the state and the
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2. Property Interest: Is There Tenant Entitlement to
Continued Occupancy of the Section 8 Unit?
As stated earlier, procedural due process is required only
challenged action. 419 U.S. at 358. The crucial question is whether HUD fosters or
encourages eviction without due process safeguards. The historical development of the
HUD § 8 regulations demonstrates that HUD initially provided a "good cause" re-
quirement for eviction from all § 8 housing, but later decided to eliminate this require-
ment for most newly constructed, substantially rehabilitated and regular existing
housing programs. Compare 41 Fed. Reg. 16,924 (1976) with 41 Fed. Reg. 4,330 (1976).
Similarly, HUD specifically excluded the § 8 program from the lease grievance proce-
dure regulations. 24 C.F.R. § 880.226 (1977). HUD's grant of wide discretion to the
private landlord in the eviction process is readily distinguishable from the situation
in Jackson, where the defendant "never put its weight on the side of the proposed
[termination] practice by ordering it." 419 U.S. at 357.
With respect to the public function theory, the Court in Jackson recognized the
proposition that state action is present because private persons exercised powers tradi-
tionally reserved to the state. Id. at 352. Relying upon state cases, the Court found that
supplying utility services was neither a city nor a state function. The Court stated that
the conduct of an enterprise is not state action merely because it is affected with or is
essential to the public interest. Id. at 352-53. The power delegated to the private entity
must be one "traditionally associated with sovereignty, such as eminent domain." Id.
Public housing historically has been a function of federal and state government. 42
U.S.C. § 1401 (1970). With the advent of the § 221(d)(3), § 236, § 23 and § 8 programs
(see notes 2, 4 supra) private persons can be said to be performing functions tradition-
ally reserved to government. Under § 8, private landlords are being induced into the
public housing area subject to the pervasive regulatory schemes of the various pro-
grams. Thus, the § 8 owner is providing a service (public housing) that from its
inception was the sole responsibility of federal, state and local governments. Conse-
quently, it is arguable that the action of the § 8 landlord constitutes government action
under the "public function" state action doctrine. This argument, however, is a ten-
uous one particularly in light of the Supreme Court's restriction of Amalgamated Food
Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968) in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407
U.S. 551 (1972). However, this does not prevent the public function aspects of the § 8
program from being considered along with the other circumstances in determining the
presence of governmental action. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715,
722 (1961).
It should be noted that there is a distinction in the above discussion between
government action, federal or state, in terms of due process and the requirement of
state action for jurisdiction in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970). This
section is used in conjunction with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) which creates a cause of
action for violations of civil rights under color of state law. See Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d
1236 (4th Cir. 1973); McQueen v. Druker, 317 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Mass. 1970), aff'd,
438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971). In newly constructed and substantially rehabilitated § 8
housing where state action is absent, jurisdiction may also be established under sec-
tions that do not require "state action." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970) (federal question).
See, e.g., Marshall v. Lynn, 497 F.2d 643 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Thompson v. Washington,
497 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Anderson v. Denny, 365 F. Supp. 1254 (W.D. Va. 1973);
Lawrence v. Oakes, 361 F. Supp. 432 (D. Vt. 1973); Davis v. Romney, 355 F. Supp. 29
(E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd., 490 F.2d 1350 (3rd Cir. 1973); 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (mandamus).
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when liberty or property interests are involved. In Board of
Regents v. Roth' the Court stated:
Certain attributes of "property" interests protected by proce-
dural due process emerge from [the Court's] decisions. To
have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must
have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must
have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, in-
stead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a
purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those
claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance
that must not be arbitrarily undermined. It is a purpose of
the constitutional right to a hearing to provide an opportun-
ity for a person to vindicate those claims.
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Con-
stitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law- rules or understand-
ings that support claims or entitlement to those benefits.'50
In Roth, the plaintiff, a nontenured professor, was termi-
nated without a hearing at the end of his first year with a state
university. The Court held that Roth possessed no legitimate
claim to reemployment and thus had no due.process right to a
hearing. A companion case, Perry v. Sindermann,'I involved a
nontenured professor who had been rehired for ten consecutive
years before being terminated by the college without a hearing.
In asserting a due process right to a hearing, the petitioner
contended that his interest in continued employment, "though
not secured by a formal contractual tenure provision, was se-
cured by a no less binding understanding fostered by the col-
lege administration."'5 2 The Court recognized that the absence
of an explicit contractual provision may not always foreclose
the possibility that a teacher has a " 'property' interest in
reemployment."' 5 3 It stated that certain "rules and under-
standings" may comprise an unwritten "common law" in the
university that would be tantamount to a written tenure con-
408 U.S. 564 (1972).
' Id. at 577.
"5 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
12 Id. at 599-60.
"I Id. at 601.
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tract.'54 Citing Roth, the Court reiterated that "[a] person's
interest in a benefit is a 'property' interest for due process
purposes if there are such rules or mutually explicit under-
standings that support his claim of entitlement to the benefit
and that he may invoke at a hearing.'1
5
After Goldberg v. Kelly' 6 the courts have consistently held
that tenants of conventional public housing have a property
interest in continued occupancy.'5 7 In regard to privately-
owned, federally-subsidized housing, in Joy v. Daniels'58 the
Fourth Circuit held that tenants of such quasi public housing
have a property interest in continued occupancy after the
expiration of a rental term. In applying the principles enun-
ciated in Goldberg, Roth and Sindermann, the court in Joy
looked to the "applicable statutes, governmental regulations
and custom and understandings of the public landlords in the
operation of their apartments.""'5 The court held that Congress
intended for that particular housing program (section 221(d)
(3)) to provide a "decent home and suitable living environ-
' Id. at 602.
' Id. at 601. The Court proceeded to hold that the petitioner had been denied
due process and was entitled to a hearing to challenge the termination. Id. at 603.
See also Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), in which a city employee, dismissed
without a hearing, claimed a due process property interest in continued employment.
The Court recognized that the property interest can be created by ordinance or implied
contract. Id. at 344. However, the Court held that the sufficiency of the claim of
entitlement must be decided by the reference to state law. Id. The district court
construed the ordinance to mean that the municipal employee held his position at the
will of the-city even though the personnnel ordinance provided for dismissal "[i]f a
permanent employee fails to perform work up to the standard of the classification
. . ." Id. at 344 n.5. After examining the lower court's interpretation, the Court held
that there was no deprivation of a property interest protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment.
1- 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
117 Caulder v. Durham Hous. Auth., 433 F.2d 998, 1003 (4th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971); Escalera v. New York City Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970). While the Escalera decision only appeared
to assume that eligible families were entitled to continued occupancy of low rent units,
this assumption was expressly endorsed in Lopez v. Henry Phipps Plaza South, Inc.,
498 F.2d 937, 943 (2d Cir. 1974).
Families in conventional public housing projects have a similar right to be heard
on the matter of rental increases. Thompson v. Washington, 497 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (right based on statutory interpretation); Burr v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous.
Auth., 479 F.2d 1165 (2d Cir. 1973).
'M 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973).
M' Id. at 1240.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
ment for every American family""'6 and to provide "an atmos-
phere of stability, security, neighborliness and social jus-
tice."' In addition, the court referred to HUD regulations bar-
ring discrimination and arbitrary treatment of tenants in sec-
tion 221(d)(3) units. Finally, the court stated that the "ten-
ant's expectation of some degree of permanency, seemingly
shared by the Congress, if not the landlord, is bolstered by
custom. Just as there may be a 'common law' of tenure at a
college or university, there may be a common law of tenancy
in public housing projects.""'6 Thus, the court found that ten-
ancies in subsidized housing programs cannot be terminated
without good cause as a matter of federal law and that this
reasonable expectation to continued entitlement is protected
by the due process clause.' 3
A strong argument can be made that continued occupancy
of section 8 assisted units is also a property right under the due
process clause. Property rights can be altered by legislation,"4
implied contracts,' 5 rules or mutually explicit understand-
ings,'66 and even common law or custom.'67 The HCDA, which
created the section 8 program, states in part:
It is the policy of the United States to promote the general
welfare of the nation [bk assisting] several States and their
political subdivisions to remedy the unsafe -and unsanitary
housing conditions and the acute shortage of decent, safe,
and sanitary dwellings for families of low income .... "I
Section 8(a) of the HCDA further states that payments will be
made "[flor the purpose of aiding lower-income families in
obtaining a decent place to live and of promoting economically
mixed housing . ... "69 These statutory goals are almost
110 Id. at 1240, quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1701t (1976).
Id., quoting McQueen v. Druker, 317 F. Supp. 1122, 1130 (D. Mass. 1970).
6 Id. at 1241.
"1 Id. Accord, Lopez v. Henry Phipps Plaza South, Inc., 498 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.
1974); Anderson v. Denny, 365 F. Supp. 1254 (W.D. Va. 1973); McQueen v. Druker,
317 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Mass. 1970), affl'd, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971); Bonner v. Park
Lake Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 333 N.Y.S.2d 277 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
"64 See text accompanying note 150 supra for a discussion of the source of property
interests.
I65 Id.
266 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972).
"6 Id. at 602.
,62 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (Supp. V 1975).
"' Id. § 1437f(a).
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identical to the goals of the section 221(d) (3) program that was
under consideration by the court in Joy, and similar rights of
entitlement can be inferred from the statutes enacting the
leased housing program. By fair implication it appears that low
income tenants, once entitled to assistance under the HDCA,
cannot lose entitlement without good cause. Section 8 tenants
must meet certain statutory conditions to be eligible for the
programY.70 Once they are deemed eligible and accepted in a
federally assisted unit, entitlement to continued occupancy is
legally indistinguishable from tenants of conventional or subsi-
dized public housing projects.171 Under this theory, the
"common law" of public housing, regardless of the program,
recognizes that the tenant may normally expect continued oc-
cupancy. Notwithstanding HUD's failure to require good cause
for eviction from most section 8 housing172 and to exclude the
section 8 program from lease and grievance procedure regula-
tions,17 1 section 8 tenants should be entitled to the same benefit
04 See text accompanying notes 22, 28 supra for income eligibility requirements.
" HUD requires a minimum one-year lease term. 24 C.F.R. § 880.219(a) (1977)
(newly constructed); id. § 882.107(b) (existing housing). This raises the question of
whether HUD may justifiably expect continued tenancy after the term. Sindermann,
however, states that formal elements should not be controlling. 480 U.S. at 601-03.
Instead, one should look to the normal practice of the programs. See Due Process in
Subsidized Housing, supra note 109, at 904-05.
With respect to congressional intent, it appears that if a tenant's income increases
to the point that the rent subsidy ceases, the tenant can continue to live in the unit
and pay the full market rent. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(3), (4) (Supp. V 1975). "This
suggests the Congress was contemplating more occupancy entitlement than limited
leasehold terms." Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1241 (4th Cir. 1973) (dealing with a
similar feature of § 221(d)(3) housing.)
"I On September 30, 1976, HUD excluded § 8 new construction, substantial reha-
bilitation (unless financed under § 202 of the National Housing Act of 1959) and
regular existing housing from regulations requiring "good cause" before a landlord of
privately-owned subsidized housing may evict a tenant. 24 C.F.R. Part 450 (1977); see
note 95 supra. With regard to exclusion of new construction and substantial rehabilita-
tion housing, HUD's rationale was that the § 8 program "can serve the nation best by
vesting in private owners the fullest measure of management responsibilities." In
excluding regular existing housing HUD stated that an "evicted family is free to find
another eligible dwelling and continue to receive the benefit of their 'Certification to
Family Participation'." 24 C.F.R. Part 450 (1977). Despite HUD's stated intent to
exclude most § 8 tenants from the "good cause" requirements, it did condition their
exclusion on "the absence of a definitive court decision" to the contrary. Id. Certainly
HUD's action is not definitive in determining whether there is a statutory entitlement
to continued occupancy.
'- 24 C.F.R. § 866.1-.59 (1977); id. § 880.226 (newly constructed); id. § 882.216
(existing housing).
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of continued occupancy as their counterparts in other public
housing. If not, the purpose of the section 8 program will not
be realized and it will be less meaningful for its intended bene-
ficiaries.
7 1
There are several weaknesses with the above argument.
First, a landlord can elect to withdraw from the section 8 pro-
gram by failing to renew the housing assistance payments con-
tract, with the result that formerly subsidized tenants will be
unable to pay the contract rent. 75 Second, the section 8 regula-
tions, with the exception of certain types of housing, permit
termination of the lease upon thirty days written notice by
either party with no mention of good cause. 7 1 If these regula-
tions are valid, section 8 tenants' due process property rights
are severely restricted.'" Any judicial interpretation of these
regulations which allows this kind of arbitrary termination of
section 8 tenancies would unduly restrict application of due
process principles as defined by the Court in recent years.'7 1
"I A similar approach was taken in Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973).
In holding that tenants of subsidized housing have a property right to continued
occupancy, the court found that the goal of providing "a decent home and suitable
living environment" included providing an "atmosphere of stability, security, neigh-
borliness and social justice." Id. at 1240, quoting McQueen v. Druker, 317 F. Supp.
1122, 1130 (D. Mass. 1970). In McQueen, the court found that arbitrary evictions would
create a "sense of injustice" and an "atmosphere of hostility" which would encourage
"anomie and alienation." 317 F. Supp. at 1130. Both courts concluded that the ten-
ant's interest in continued occupancy could be implied from the purpose of the housing
program. The same rationale applies to the § 8 program. A similar conclusion is made
in Leased Housing Program, supra note 2, at 1187-89.
I's 24 C.F.R. § 880.109 (1977) (newly constructed); id. § 882.107 (existing housing).
It has been stated that it might be possible legally to require a landlord to renew the
assistance payments contracts if bad faith and government action is attributable to
the landlord (wholly apart from the lapsed housing assistance payment contracts).
Leased Housing Program, supra note 2, at 1189-90.
"' 24 C.F.R. § 880.219(a) (1977) (newly constructed); id. § 882.107(b) (existing
housing). If the § 8 units are HUD-owned or financed by a HUD-insured mortgager,
"good cause" must be shown by the owner. Id. Part 450. See notes 95-99 supra, and
accompanying text. Strangely, where 24 C.F.R. Part 450 applies, even if there is a 30-
day notice clause in the lease, the landlord must show "good cause" to evict.
'" For a discussion of judicial review of federal regulations, see generally K. Davis,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 503 (1958 & Supp. 1976); L. Jaffe, JUDICIAL CONTROL
OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACrION, 564-65 (1965).
119 Compare Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (due process and termination of
government employment) with Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) and
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
It should be noted with respect to the existing housing program that 24 C.F.R. §
882.215 (1977), requiring PHA approval of an owner's decision to evict, may conflict
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3. Procedural Requirements: Balancing the Interests of the
Parties
Oncd the existence of government action and the right to
continued occupancy are demonstrated, any proposed action to
evict a section 8 tenant must be accompanied by some proce-
dural safeguards. In the past decade the Supreme Court has
had many occasions to consider the extent to which due process
requires an evidentiary hearing prior to the deprivation of a
property interest.' In only one case, Goldberg v. Kelly, 10 has
the Court required a judicial-type hearing. 8 ' Decisions of the
Court make it clear that due process is not a "technical concep-
tion with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circum-
stances."'' 2 Instead, due process is "flexible and calls for such
with 24 C.F.R. § 882.107 (1977) to the extent that the latter permits a 30-day notice
of termination without cause. Such PHA approval is required by the statute. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437f(d)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1975). With respect to newly constructed or substantially
rehabilitated § 8 housing, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(e)(2) (Supp. V 1975) states that the
contract between HUD and the owner shall give the responsibility of terminating
tenancies to the owner. The general policy of § 8, set out in notes 168-74 supra and
accompanying text, may create an entitlement to continued occupancy protected by
due process in spite of any clause permitting termination on 30 days notice. This is
the result with § 8 housing covered by HUD's regulations on evictions from certain
subsidized housing. See note 176 supra. But see note 172 supra concerning certificates
of family participation. Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973), discussed in notes
158-63 supra and accompanying text, and Caulder v. Durham Hous. Auth., 433 F.2d
998 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971), involved leases permitting
termination on 30 days notice prior to the end of the term in federally subsidized and
conventional public housing, respectively. Nevertheless, the courts held that due pro-
cess protected those tenants from the landlord's arbitrary exercise of the termination
notice. It is unclear in both cases whether HUD had approved the notice of termination
clause.
I"' See, e.g., Dixon v. Love, 431" U.S. 105 (1977); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970);
Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
II 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
II Id. at 266-71. The Court held that the hearing must contain the following
elements: (1) timely notice of, and reasons for, proposed action which affects the
recipient; (2) the right of the recipient to make an oral presentation; (3) the right to
cross-examine witnesses before an impartial decisionmaker; (4) the right to be repre-
sented by counsel; and (5) the right to a decision based solely upon the evidence
presented at the hearing and which states the facts and reasoning underlying the
decision. Id. HUD has provided an almost identical due process hearing to conven-
tional public housing tenants who seek to challenge their eviction or to raise other
grievances. 24 C.F.R. § 866.53(c), .56, .57 (1977). See note 106 supra for a discussion
of the regulations.
"2 Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
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procedural protections as the particular situation demands.' '8 3
In applying the principles of due process to a particular admin-
istrative scheme, there must be an analysis of the private and
government interests that are affected. 8' As the Court recently
reiterated in Mathews v. Eldridge:"1
5
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process gener-
ally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the
private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards and finally,
the Government's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail."'
The interest of the assisted tenant in preventing arbitrary
evictions is readily apparent: The loss of assisted housing is
likely to impose financial hardship on the evicted tenant.'87 In
addition to financial strain, the evicted tenant will suffer psy-
chological deprivation relating to a change in neighbors and
familiar surroundings."' If a tenant is evicted for being undesir-
able, it is likely that he will be unable to qualify for other
public housing or even private housing if the stigma of being
(1961), quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 344 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951)
(concurring opinion).
"' Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
' Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976). See also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416
U.S. 134, 167-68 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,
401-06 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-71 (1970); Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers Local 973 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895-96 (1961). A relevant factor is whether
the opportunity to present and cross-examine witnesses will lead to a fair disposition
of the dispute. Compare Escalera v. New York City Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 862-67
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970) (eviction from public housing) with Burr
v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 479 F.2d 1165, 1168-69 (2d Cir. 1973) (general rent
increase in public housing).
195 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
"I Id. at 335. In Eldridge, the Court held that due process did not require an
evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of Social Security disability benefits. The
Court distinguished the Social Security procedure from the welfare termination proce-
dure struck down in Goldberg. Id. at 344-46. See note 194 infra regarding possible
procedures for hearings.
"87 Unlike the Social Security benefits terminated in Eldridge, eligibility for § 8
housing is based on need.
lu McQueen v. Druker, 317 F. Supp. 1122, 1130 (D. Mass. 1970), aff'd on other
grounds, 436 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971).
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undesirable follows him. An injury to reputation has been held
sufficient to require an adversary hearing.'89 Arbitrary evictions
subvert the recognized goals of the public housing program to
enable all citizens to obtain and continue occupancy in decent,
safe, sanitary dwellings that promote the development of so-
cially acceptable lifestyles.15 0
The second element in the three part due process standard
of Eldridge is the risk of an "erroneous deprivation" of the
tenant's interest. Under the existing housing program, the
PHA must approve the eviction. Although the tenant must be
given notice of the eviction and the reasons therefore, there is
no express provision for an administrative hearing either before
or after the eviction. No informal grievance procedure exists
that enables the tenant or his counsel to present his side of the
case. '9 Also, there are not requirements of "good cause" or
materiality regarding the tenant's noncompliance with the
lease. 912 In the newly constructed and substantially rehabili-
tated programs the risk of "erroneous deprivation" is even
greater. Here evictions are solely the function of the owner; no
PHA authorization is required unless the owner seeks assis-
tance payments while the unit is unrented, in which case the
owner must certify to the PHA that the eviction did not violate
the lease, contract, or any applicable law. Again, no hearing
procedure is provided and there exists no meaningful check on
arbitrary evictions by the owner. 9 3
I I Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1974). But see Bishop v. Wood,
426 U.S. 341, 347-49 (1976).
"N See notes 169-174 supra and accompanying text for additional discussion of
these goals.
"' Cf. 24 C.F.R. § 866.54 (1977) (conventional program prehearing procedure).
1 See notes 96-98 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the eviction
notice.
"I See notes 100-114 supra and accompanying text for eviction procedures in the
newly constructed and substantially rehabilitated programs.
" ' See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), where the Court recognized that
an important consideration was the fairness and reliability of the pretermination pro-
cedures and the existence or extent of additional procedural safeguards. Id. at 343. The
Court found that the determination of disability, or lack thereof, is "a more sharply
focused and easily documented decision than the typical determination of welfare
entitlement [where] . ..a wide variety of information may be deemed relevant, and
issues of witness credibility and veracity often are critical to the decisionmaking pro-
cess." Id. at 343-44. The Court found that the risk of error is not as great in the
disability assessment where written medical reports are the basis for the termination.
Id. at 343-45. The Court further distinguished the welfare termination procedure in its
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In all three programs, existing, newly constructed, and
substantially rehabilitated housing, there is a considerable risk
of erroneous deprivation to the tenant, assuming there is a
property interest. Therefore, additional safeguards should be
afforded the section 8 tenant.' 4 The extent of these additional
safeguards cannot be determined without balancing the inter-
ests of the tenant, owner, and government and analyzing the
fiscal and administrative burdens accompanying these safe-
guards.
As stated earlier, the existing housing regulations require
PHA approval of all evictions. The PHA is under an obligation
to provide judicial-type hearings to tenants being evicted from
all properties (including section 8 projects) owned by or leased
to PHA's and leased or subleased by PHA's to tenants."5 The
PHA's are experienced in conducting these hearings and could
provide the same type of hearing to other section 8 tenants with
little difficulty or hardship. The private owner would bear the
burden of these additional hearings and would be required to
attend them to defend his actions. If these hearings could be
held at the apartment project, this burden might be reduced.,9
Nevertheless, a financial and administrative burden on the
owner is obviously present, and it may be that many landlords
would not participate in the program if they had to defend all
of their evictions in an administrative hearing.19
failure to "provide an effective means for the recipient to communicate his case to the
decisionmaker." Id. at 345. Written submissions were unrealistic because most recipi-
ents lacked the "educational attainment necessary to write effectively" and could not
afford professional counsel. Id., quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970).
The Court found additional safeguards in the use of detailed questionnaires, medical
sources such as doctors for reporting facts, and objective diagnostic and laboratory
methods. 424 U.S. at 345.
I'5 See note 100 supra. See also Caulder v. Durham Hous. Auth., 433 F.2d 998,
1004 n.3 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971) and Escalera v. New York
City Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 861 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970) which
indicate that a full evidentiary hearing could be dispensed with in compelling circum-
stances.
,,I See Leased Housing Program, supra, note 2, at 1192 n.236. This assumes that
the apartment project has the facilities for such a hearing and that it is in a convenient
location for the owner and decisionmaker.
"I It has been suggested that such a hearing could work to the advantage of a
landlord. In a situation where the tenant loses the administrative hearing, it is said
the tenant may vacate voluntarily and spare the landlord the necessity of court action.
Leased Housing Program, supra note 2, at 1194-95. It is unlikely that many landlords
will view the process in that way, but rather will expect the worst from their tenants.
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A less burdensome alternative would be to require the
owner to conduct a factfinding hearing prior to the eviction.
Here the owner would wear the hats of judge, jury, and prosecu-
tor and it is unlikely that the tenant would be able to obtain
an impartial hearing and decision. 98 Owners may even resist
the burden of conducting mini-hearings in all proposed evic-
tions. They would be more likely to allow the normal judicial
process to handle the matter so as to avoid "litigating" the case
twice.
In fact, it is this alternative, judicial hearings, that was
chosen in several cases dealing with eviction from privately
owned subsidized housing. '99 These federal courts and HUD °0
recognize that a tenant's right to continued occupancy in the
absence of good cause for termination is based on federal law
and is a defense in state judicial proceedings. The key ingredi-
ent to this alternative is the availability of a constitutionally
sufficient hearing in the state courts.2"' Another problem is the
inability of certain low income tenants to obtain legal serv-
ices."1
In light of Eldridge, it is highly unlikely that lower courts
" Cf. Lopez v. Henry Phipps Plaza South, Inc., 498 F.2d 937, 943-44 (2d Cir.
1974) which holds that a manager of one subsidized development could adjudicate
eviction hearings involving a tenant of a second development owned by the same
company. Accord, Wilson v. Lincoln Redevelopment Corp., 488 F.2d 339 (8th Cir.
1973). See also 24 C.F.R. Part 450 (1977) (eviction process in certain subsidized hous-
ing as described in note 95, supra). The proposed regulation called for an informal
administrative hearing by the landlord. 24 C.F.R. Part 450 (1977).
"I Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1242-43 (4th Cir. 1973); Anderson v. Denny, 365
F. Supp. 1254, 1260-62 (W.D. Va. 1973); McQueen v. Druker, 317 F. Supp. 1122, 1131
(D. Mass. 1970), aff'd on other grounds, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971). See also Johnson*
v. Tamsberg, 430 F.2d 1125, 1127 (4th Cir. 1970) (conventional public housing).
2 24 C.F.R. Part 450 (1977).
"I Many state tribunals, unfamiliar with the "good cause" requirement, will be
prone to adhere to the traditional summary eviction process. See Due Process in
Subsidized Housing, supra note 109, at 909.
2 An additional problem is noted in Leased Housing Program, supra note 2, at
1194 n.242:
Provision of an evidentiary hearing only within a state's eviction proceeding
may put tenants to an unenviable choice when a dispute arises concerning
the payment of late rental fees or fines for building damage. If the tenant
chooses not to pay, he risks possible eviction. In conventional public housing
cases, the courts have held that, if tenants are to be evicted for nonpayment
of additional charges, due process requires that they be permitted to chal-
lenge the assessment of fees through an administrative procedure. Escalera
v. New York City Housing Auth., 382 F. Supp. 992 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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will interpret the due process clause to require an administra-
tive hearing for evictions in the section 8 program. The admin-
istrative and fiscal burden on the PHA and the owner probably
will be deemed to outweigh the tenants' interest. Most courts
will probably relegate tenants to the eviction process in state
courts. To the extent that state court proceedings permit par-
ties to present evidence and expose falsehoods or misunder-
standings through cross examination, such hearings are better
suited to a just resolution of disputes than a "hearing" con-
ducted by the landlord. Courts have adopted this approach in
reviewing the due process requirements in eviction proceedings
from subsidized housing. 2°3 Even if this alternative is adopted,
it is still essential that the section 8 owner be subject to a good
cause requirement before evicting a tenant, and that the state
courts adopt procedures that recognize this standard. 24 The
relative burden on the owner would be minimal; he must go to
court in any event. The landlord would be spared the burden
of two hearings and he would be assured of being able to evict
any tenant who was violating a material lease provision or state
law.
11. ADMISSIONS UNDER THE SECTION 8 PROGRAM
As described in Part I, under section 8 only a small fraction
of the units must be allocated to the poorest of the poor.
2
1
5
Furthermore, there is a substantial likelihood of arbitrary ac-
tion by landlords in the admission process.
See cases cited in note 199 supra.
' The summary process in evictions is not in itself unconstitutional. Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). Current HUD regulations applicable to certain subsidized
housing programs other than those of § 8 assume that state courts will adopt adequate
procedures. See Preamble to 24 C.F.R. Pirt 450 at 41 Fed. Reg. 43330 (1976). See also
note 109 supra. No such regulation applies to the regular existing housing or newly
constructed and substantially rehabilitated programs which are not financed under §
202 of the National Housing Act of 1959. See notes 95-104 supra and accompanying
text for discussion of the eviction procedure.
A potential problem for the § 8 landlord is a situation in which other tenants refuse
to testify as witnesses about the facts supporting "good cause" because of fear of
reprisal. It has been suggested that, under certain circumstances, anonymous informa-
tion be accepted in any administrative hearings relating to evictions of § 8 tenants.
Leased Housing Program, supra note 2, at 1193-94. This could give rise to constitu-
tional difficulties.
"I See text accompanying notes 22-31 supra.
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A. The Admission Process
As in the area of evictions, the regulations regarding ad-
mission to newly constructed or substantially rehabilitated
units differ from the existing housing regulations. In existing
housing the PHA makes the initial eligibility determinations
for prospective tenants.20 Eligible tenants are issued certifi-
cates of family participation (CFP) by the PHA.207 The CFP is
valid for sixty days unless the family submits a request for lease
approval within that time.28 However, the regulations allow
the PHA to grant extensions of the CFP up to sixty days if the
PHA believes that there is a reasonable possibility of finding a
suitable unit.0 ' Once in receipt of a CFP, the holder must
locate an eligible owner who is willing to lease the unit to
them.210 Under this so-called "finders-keepers" policy the bur-
den of locating available housing is on the eligible family. If the
family requests, the PHA is required to assist in this search.
21 1
Once the CFP is issued, the owner controls the tenant selection
process and makes the final decision on who becomes his ten-
ant.
21
2
Similarly, owners of newly constructed or substantially
rehabilitated units control the selection of tenants. 21 The
owner is required to follow the statutory criteria in determining
eligibility.2 14 A standardized application is required as well. 215
The application may be refused by the owner if he has no
vacancies and his waiting list is such that there would be an
"unreasonable" length of time before the family could be ad-
mitted.21 If there are vacancies and the owner determines that
m 24 C.F.R. § 882.209(a) (1977). See notes 22-31 supra and accompanying text
for a description of eligibility requirements.
2v 24 C.F.R. § 882.209(b) (1977); id. Part 882, app. El.
2- Id. § 882.209(d)(1).
-' Id. § 882.209(d)(2). This regulation further provides that upon expiration of a
certificate of family participation, the family can apply for another certificate.
211 Id. § 882.103(a). The PHA is required to promote a "greater choice of housing
opportunities" by working with owners, families, and other PHA's. Id. § 882.103(c).
21, Id. § 882.103(a).
2,2 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1975). See also 24 C.F.R. § 882.210(a)(2)
(1977).
"1 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(e)(2) (Supp. V 1975); 24 C.F.R. § 882.218(b) (1977).
21 Id. See notes 22-31 supra and accompanying text for a description of eligibility
requirements.
21 24 C.F.R. § 880.218(b)(2) (1977).
211 Id. The regulations fail to define "unreasonable" and do not provide for an
1977]
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the applicant is eligible on the basis of income and family
composition and the applicant is "otherwise acceptable," the
owner and family must enter into a lease." 7 If no vacancies
exist the owner must place the applicant on a waiting list."'
The regulations do not define the term "otherwise acceptable";
thus, applicants have no idea what to expect when they apply
for assisted housing since there are no public and uniform
selection criteria. If an applicant satisfies the income and fam-
ily composition requirements and is rejected, no procedure ex-
ists whereby he is notified of the reason for the rejection and
provided an opportunity to discuss the rejection with the
owner. 21 1 On the other hand, if the unit is owned by the PHA,
the regulations require a written notice to the applicant ex-
plaining the basis for the rejection and informing him of the
right to an informal hearing. Further, if the applicant is re-
jected after the PHA hearing, he has the right to HUD review
of the PHA determination.
22
1
It is not surprising that HUD and Congress have delegated
the responsibility of tenant selection to the owner. Under the
HCDA and applicable regulations the owner is responsible for
maintenance and management of his units. 22' Since the owner
bears the risk of damage to the units and of default in payment
of rent, he is given the opportunity to screen his prospective
tenants. The landlord has incentive to deny admission to any
applicant that he considers undesirable. Applicants with young
appeal or reconsideration of the owner's determination that the application will not
be accepted.
217 Id. § 880.21.8(b)(4).
219 Id. § 880.218(b)(3). There are no regulations governing how applicants are to
be ranked in these lists and io express requirement that an owner inform an applicant
of his place on the list. An exception applies when a PHA is the owner. In such a case,
the agency must inform applicants on the waiting list of the approximate date by
which a suitable unit will be available "insofar as such a date can be reasonably
determined." Id. § 880.218(b) (6).
219 In such cases, applicants for conventional public housing have a right created
by statute and regulation to an informal hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(3) (Supp. V
1975); 24 C.F.R. §§ 860.201-.207 (1977). Compare the similar rights of applicants to
the § 23 program described in Leased Housing Program, supra note 2, at 1196-97.
-0 24 C.F.R. § 880.218(b)(6) (1977).
"1 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(e) (2) (Supp. V 1975); 24 C.F.R. §§ 880.119, .221 (1977) (newly
constructed); 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(c) (Supp. V 1975); 24 C.F.R. §§ 882.117, .211
(1977) (existing housing).
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children, families considered to be unstable, and those with
criminal records may find it difficult to obtain assisted hous-
ing. Landlords are not expressly prohibited by regulation from
denying admission solely on the basis of past criminal records
and family instability. 2 An additional incentive to rejecting
large and socially undesirable families is the statutory prefer-
ence given to applications for newly constructed and substan-
tially rehabilitated units that propose to seek assistance for
twenty percent or less of the total number of units in develop-
ment.22 This economic mix of tenants will probably cause the
owner to exercise extreme caution in selecting tenants in order
to prevent offending middle class tenants in the development.
The section 8 program will probably result in many of the
families most in need of decent housing, the problem poor,
being foreclosed from obtaining it. They will be excluded from
newly constructed and substantially rehabilitated projects be-
cause of pressure on the owner to appease his middle class
tenants and to prevent damage or default for which he is al-
most entirely responsible. Those seeking existing housing units
will be subject to the "finders-keepers" policy which will favor
tenants with the ability to "sell" themselves and the mobility
to locate prospective units.
24
The outlook for prospective tenants is not altogether bleak.
The regulations require that at least thirty percent of all as-
sisted units in each project be occupied by "very low income"
families, that is, families whose income does not exceed fifty
percent of the median income for the area.25 However, depend-
ing upon the median income for any geographical area, the
definition of very low income might or might not be at the
poverty level because section 8 landlords have discretion to
select persons at the high range of the very low income group.
In addition, assurances by owners of compliance with fair hous-
ing and other civil rights laws are required. 2 1 With respect to
22 See note 230 infra and accompanying text.
2m 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(5) (Supp. V 1975); 24 C.F.R. § 880.104 (1977).
"I It has been suggested that landlords may be deterred from renting to potential
tenants under the existing housing program because of the government regulations
involved. Indeed the red tape may be used by landlords as an excuse to refuse to rent
to families when the real reasons may be illegal. Leased Housing Program, supra note
2, at 1201.
24 C.F.R. § 880.117 (1977); id. § 882.113; 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(7) (Sup. V 1975).
' 24 C.F.R. §§ 880.205(j), 882.204(b)(1) (1977).
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new and rehabilitated projects, HUD regulations state that
management and operation must be free of racial, religious,
and sex-based discrimination. 27 Further safeguards for newly
constructed and substantially rehabilitated projects include a
prior showing of management capability22s and assurances that
the location of the project is not in a racially concentrated
neighborhood or at a site with adverse environmental condi-
tions.
229
The most significant protection for prospective section 8
tenants is contained in the housing assistance payments con-
tract which prohibits automatic exclusion "because of mem-
bership in a class such as unmarried mothers, recipients of
public assistance, etc." 30 It is unclear how these regulations are
to be enforced. The housing contract compels the owners of
newly constructed and substantially rehabilitated units to co-
operate with the government in compliance reviews and com-
plaint investigations pursuant to civil rights laws and regula-
tions. 231 It is not clear that the complaint investigation process
applies to discrimination other than that based on race, reli-
gion, color, sex, or national origin or whether the complaint
investigation process is effective before the housing assistance
payments contract is executed.
2
In conclusion, there is little doubt that the admissions
process in the section 8 program is susceptible to abuse by
discriminatory owners. The absence of a "good cause" require-
ment for rejecting applicants and the lack of uniform, public
In Id. § 880.218(a). An affirmative marketing program is required in any proposal
for five or more units. Id. §§ 880.209(a)(7), .218(a).
2n Id. § 880.209(a)(10).
2 Id. § 880.112. See notes 46-49 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of
site selection.
23 24 C.F.R. § 882, app. II, § 2.1(a) (1977) (existing housing). The housing assis-
tance payments contract for new construction is contained in the HUD Processing
Handbook 7420.1. It was formerly located in appendix II of the regulations. 40 Fed.
Reg. 18,698 (1975). Since many applicants for newly constructed and substantially
rehabilitated housing will learn of the program only through the owner, they may be
ignorant of these rights. PHA's are required to inform holders of certificates of partici-
pation of their rights. 24 C.F.R. § 882.209(c) (1977).
23, 24 C.F.R. § 882, app. II, § 2.2 (1977) (existing housing); HUD Processing
Handbook 7420.1 (newly constructed). See note 230 supra regarding the housing assis-
tance contract.
232 Leased Housing Program, supra note 2, at 1203.
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standards of admission give wide discretion to the owner. 21 In
addition, the eligible applicant who has been rejected is not
given a quick and inexpensive administrative remedy to con-
test the owner's decision. This is especially true in instances of
discrimination where the civil rights statutes are not applica-
ble. It is HUD's policy not to interfere with the owners in the
tenant selection process and it is unlikely that it will alter this
policy. Thus, the rejected tenant may look only to the judiciary
for relief.
B. Application of Due Process Requirements to Section 8
Admission Procedures
In conventional public housing programs, applicants de-
nied admission to a project are given prompt notice of the
reason for the denial and the right to an informal hearing.234 In
the section 8 program applicants for newly constructed and
substantially rehabilitated housing who are rejected by a non-
PHA owner are not given these procedural safeguards. Appli-
cants for certificates of family participation in existing housing
who are determined ineligible by the PHA are given an infor-
mal hearing.2"5 However, once the family receives a certificate
from the PHA and is rejected by an owner, these procedural
safeguards do not apply and the family has no recourse under
the regulations.
From a constitutional standpoint, the due process safe-
guards of notice and the right to an impartial hearing will
attach only if the section 8 applicant can satisfy the test pre-
viously set forth:215 governmental action in the denial of admis-
sion, and a property interest in the admission to the assisted
unit.
'1 See note 230 supra and accompanying text. There is a "good cause" require-
ment of sorts that applies to owners receiving housing assistance payments due to
vacancies in assisted units. In order to be eligible for such payments, the owner may
not reject "any eligible applicant, except for good cause acceptable to HUD or the PHA
.... " 24 C.F.R. § 880.107(b), (c)(1) (1977) (newly constructed); id. § 882.105(b)(2)
(existing housing). The rejected applicant is not in a position to benefit from this
requirement and enforcement by HUD will be difficult. Compare Leased Housing
Program, supra note 2, at 1204 with the regulations dealing with continued assistance
payments after an eviction described in notes 102-05 supra and accompanying text.
ni 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(e) (Supp. V 1975); 24 C.F.R. § 860.207 (1976).
24 C.F.R. § 882.209(f) (1977).
=' See text accompanying notes 117-25 supra for a discussion of Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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1. Governmental Action in Denial of Admission
In determining whether sufficient governmental action
exists, the specific relationship between the owner and the gov-
ernmental entity must be examined. With regard to existing
housing, there are two classes of owners: those with ongoing
assisted units who have signed contracts with the PHA; and
private owners who are approached by tenants for the first time
under the "finders-keepers" policy." 7 Even under Jackson an
argument can be made that the requisite "symbiotic relation-
ship" exists between the owner who has signed housing assis-
tance payments contracts and the PHA and HUD. 5 As an
ongoing participant in the program, the owner has received
financial support for his units. He has agreed to comply with
specific provisions of the HUD regulations and the housing
assistance payments contract and for all practical purposes he
is an arm of the PHA. 39 This is not true, however, of the purely
private landlord who is approached by a certificate holder.
Such a landlord is not bound by the housing assistance pay-
ments contract at the time and is in no way linked with HUD
or the PHA. Consequently, there is no foundation for a finding
of governmental action by the private landlord.24
With regard to newly constructed and substantially reha-
bilitated housing, there will be similar problems in establishing
the required government action as per Jackson41 and prior
Supreme Court decisions. The owner has received significant
federal subsidy in the form of financing and housing assistance
payments and these payments are conditioned upon the
27 See text accompanying notes 110-11 supra for a discussion of the "finders-
keepers" policy.
2" See notes 128-39 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
2' The owner receives a rent subsidy (housing assistance payment) even if a unit
is vacant under certain circumstances. 24 C.F.R. § 882.105 (1977). Regulations deal
with maintenance, id. § 882.211; evictions, id. § 882.215; and lease provisions, id. §
882.107(b) and app. VI. Cf. the regulations for new construction in note 144 supra. A
similar conclusion is reached in Leased Housing Program, supra note 2, at 1207.
I,0 This will undermine the potential success of the existing housing program since
the "finders-keepers" policy is the primary means of locating existing units. See 24
C.F.R. § 882.103 (1977). The certificate of family participation may very well be a
worthless document to those applicants who do not know of owners presently under
contract with PHA and HUD.
I" See text accompanying notes 128-37 supra regarding the test for state action.
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owner's compliance with HUD-imposed regulations. 142 In addi-
tion, the owner is arguably performing a public housing func-
tion traditionally reserved for federal and local governments.
243
Notwithstanding the restrictive approach taken by the Court
in Jackson, a persuasive argument could be made for finding
requisite governmental action in the denial of admission to
newly constructed and substantially rehabilitated units.244
2. Property Interest in Admission to Section 8 Housing
Assuming that government action exists in the admission
to section 8 housing, the applicant's right to a due process
hearing depends on whether he has a legitimate property inter-
est as defined by Roth, Sindermann, and subsequent Supreme
Court decisions.245 The Court has stated that the nature of the
interest asserted, not its weight, is the important consideration
in determining whether a due process property right exists. 246
At first glance, the tenant's interest in continued occu-
pancy is more readily apparent than the applicant's interest in
commencing a tenancy. A rejected applicant will not suffer
burdens such as the cost and inconvenience of being forced to
relocate. 247 The question is whether the distinction between
termination of a benefit and withholding of a benefit is consti-
tutionally significant. It can be argued that the mere expect-
ancy of a benefit is not an entitlement, especially when the
admissions process permits the landlords to exercise discretion
in deciding whether to admit an applicant.2 48 This argument is
12 See note 146 supra and accompanying text regarding incentives for the con-
struction of assisted units.
21 See note 148 supra for a discussion of the governmental action requirement
under the § 8 program.
24 A similar conclusion is reached in Leased Housing Program, supra note 2, at
1206-07. Prior lower court decisions involving eviction from § 221(d)(3) and § 236
projects are instructive. These decisions found government action on the basis of the
receipt of federal benefits and the pervasive federal regulation. See note 131 supra.
Only one of these cases, Prevo v. National Corp. in Hous. Partnerships, No. C-76-104A
(N.D. Ohio, E. Div., injunction filed June 3, 1976) was post-Jackson.
245 See text accompanying notes 149-53 supra for a discussion of Perry v. Sinder-
mann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
241 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972).
21 It may be that a tenant who seeks to transfer from a federally assisted unit to
a § 8 unit has an interest in continued occupancy in some kind of government sup-
ported housing.
21 See notes 210-31 supra and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion
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suspect for reasons outlined below.
An important factor in defining a constitutionally pro-
tected property interest is whether there are rules or mutually
explicit understandings that a claim of entitlement exists.249
Common law or custom also can be the basis of the interest.20
When an agency determines an individual's eligibility for a
benefit under criteria set forth by federal statutes or regula-
tions, the individual applicant has a legitimate expectancy
that he will not be denied assistance unless it is factually deter-
mined that he failed to satisfy those criteria. In analyzing its
previous decision in Goldberg, the Court in Roth stated:
[T]he welfare recipients in Goldberg v. Kelly . . . had a
claim of entitlement to welfare payments that was grounded
in the statute defining eligibility for them. The recipients had
not yet shown that they were, in fact, within the statutory
terms of eligibility. But we held that they had a right to a
hearing at which they might attempt to do so.2'
Thus, the key point in Goldberg was not that benefits had
previously been received, but rather that there existed statu-
tory provisions creating the right to public assistance and de-
fining the terms under which it could be obtained. 212
of the admission process. In an analogous line of cases dealing with parole that support
this proposition, courts have distinguished the interest of a prisoner seeking parole
status from that of a parolee facing revocation and reincarceration. These cases have
found a due process right in the latter situation only. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 482 n.8 (1972); United States Bd. of Parole v. Merhige, 487 F.2d 25 (4th
Cir. 1973); Scarpa v. Board of Parole, 477 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.), vacated for mootness,
414 U.S. 809 (1973); United States ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut State Bd. of Parole, 443
F.2d 1079, 1086-87 (2d Cir. 1971); Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 407-08 (2d Cir.
1970). Cf. Moody v. Daggett, Warden, 429 U.S. 78 (1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S.
215 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
203 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
2 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972).
-' 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
212 Accord, Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 375 U.S. 96 (1967)
(denial of admissions to bar); Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 123
(1926) (dictum); Geneva Towers Tenant Organization v. Federated Mortgage Inves-
tors, 504 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1974) (tenants in federally subsidized housing have a due
process property interest when HUD decides whether to authorize a general rent in-
crease); Davis v. U.S., 415 F. Supp. 1086 (D. Kan. 1976) (claimant for federal work-
man's compensation entitled to hearing); Shaw v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 268 (W.D.
N. Car. 1975) (applicant denied Social Security benefits entitled to hearing); Alexan-
der v. Silverman, 356 F. Supp. 1179 (E.D. Wis. 1973) and Barnet v. Lindsay, 319 F.
Supp. 610 (D. Utah 1970) (applicants denied welfare benefits entitled to hearing). See
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In the context of conventional public housing, several fed-
eral courts have recognized a constitutional right to a hearing
upon rejection of an applicant.253 In Colon v. Tompkins Square
Neighbors, Inc.,254 involving admission to federally subsidized
housing under section 221(d)(3), it was held that applicants
rejected solely because they were welfare recipients were de-
nied equal protection of law. While the court did not base its
decision upon due process grounds, it did provide the appli-
cants with several important procedural safeguards including
notification of the status of the application within a reasonable
time, a waiting list on a chronological basis, and uniform ad-
missions criteria.25
The nature of the applicant's interest varies with the spe-
cific section 8 program. For example, the applicant for an exist-
ing unit follows a two-step process: First, he obtains a certifi-
cate of family participation from the PHA; then he must find
an owner to accept him.256 Once the CFP is issued, it is arguable
that the applicant's claim of entitlement becomes "legitimate"
and a subsequent rejection by an owner constitutes a depriva-
tion within the purview of the due process clause. An applicant
for newly constructed and substantially rehabilitated housing,
on the other hand, does not receive certification from the PHA;
Leased Housing Program, supra note 2, at 1209-10. Contra, Zobriscky v. Los Angeles
County, 105 Cal. Rptr. 121 (Ct. App. 1972) (welfare benefits).
21 Needo v. Housing Auth. of Milwaukee, 335 F. Supp. 1397 (E.D. Wis. 1971);
Davis v. Toledo Metro. Hous. Auth., 311 F. Supp. 795 (N.D. Ohio 1970). See also
Holmes v. New York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968) (due process
requires ascertainable admissions standards and selection on reasonable bases). But
see Spady v. Mount Vernon Hous. Auth., 341 N.Y.S.2d 552 (Sup. Ct. 1973), aff'd
mem., 354 N.Y.S.2d 945, 310 N.E.2d 542, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 983 (1974); Sumpter
v. White Plains Hous. Auth., 328 N.Y.S.2d 649, 278 N.E.2d 892, cert. denied, 406 U.S.
928 (1972). These New York cases require only an informal discussion with the PHA
but seem to assume that a property interest exists.
211 294 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Accord, Male v. Crossroads Ass'n., 469 F.2d
616 (2d Cir. 1972); Thomas v. Hous. Auth., 282 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Ark. 1967). Cf.
Tyson v. New York City Hous. Auth., 369 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (eviction from
conventional public housing because of criminal acts by non-tenant family members).
21 294 F. Supp. 134, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The case was decided prior to Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See text accompanying notes 115-20 supra.
"' See notes 206-12 supra and accompanying text regarding the "finders-keepers"
admissions policy. It is noteworthy that a PHA is given discretion to adopt preferences
for groups such as displaced families or families in substandard or overcrowded hous-
ing. 24 C.F.R. § 882.204(b)(1)(i)(c) (1977); id. § 882.209(a)(2); Preamble, 56, 41 Fed.
Reg. 19,891 (1976). An informal hearing is available to rejected applicants. 24 C.F.R.
§ 882.209(f) (1977).
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his only contact is with the owner who determines income eligi-
bility and family size as well as the subjective qualification of
the application.257 Even here, however, the applicant could
argue that once he satisfies the criteria for income and family
composition his property right to assistance vests and upon
rejection by the owner he is entitled to notice of the reasons for
rejection and an informal hearing.258
The principal weakness in this argument is the degree of
discretion granted to section 8 landlords in the admission pro-
cess. Landlords may not reject applicants in violation of fair
housing laws25 or because they are welfare recipients or unwed
mothers.2 0 These restrictions may be required by the equal
protection clause as interpreted by the court in Colon. Indeed,
Colon may require that any preferences for admission be ra-
tional, thereby prohibiting discrimination against lower in-
come applicants.2 1 Beyond this, however, owners seemingly
have unlimited discretion under the regulations. 2 2 Clearly, a
landlord need not establish "good cause" to reject an appli-
cant. However, the factors do not necessarily negate a determi-
nation of entitlement by the applicant but are relevant to the
balancing of interests.
26 3
Whether the courts will hold that applicants for section 8
21 See notes 213-20 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the owner's
role in the application for assisted housing.
2 This expectancy of benefits is created by the HCDA and HUD regulations. By
the establishment of criteria for admission, the Act and regulations create a legitimate
expectation that a § 8 applicant will not be denied unless it is factually determined
that the composition of his family disqualifies him, his family income is too high, or
that he is "otherwise ineligible." The standard for denial of benefits is fully established
by the regulatory scheme just as it was in Goldberg and Roth. The applicant's property
interest is one of major importance to him, and arbitrary rejection would deprive him
of shelter and could cause him "to suffer grievous loss." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also
Davis v. United States, 415 F. Supp. 1086, 1091 (D. Kan. 1976). But see Bishop v.
Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (discussed in note 155 supra).
2' See note 226 supra and accompanying text.
260 See note 229 supra and accompanying text.
26, See notes 222, 223 supra and accompanying text.
262 See note 212 supra and accompanying text regarding existing housing, and note
217 supra and accompanying text regarding newly constructed housing. Note that
applicants have a right to an informal hearing when the owner of new construction is
a PHA. See note 220 supra.
26 See text accompanying notes 179-86 supra for a discussion of the balancing of
interests.
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housing have a legitimate claim of entitlement will depend
upon their characterization of the applicants' status as seekers
of government-assisted housing. Congress"' and the Secretary
of HUD265 have concluded that the right to adequate shelter is
a basic human need and right, and it is reasonable to expect
that the judiciary will adopt a similar view when considering
whether due process applies to the section 8 admission process.
3. Procedural Requirements: Balancing the Interests of the
Parties
Once it has been determined that due process applies to
the section 8 application process, the question of what process
is due remains; that is, what are the precise procedural safe-
guards to which the rejected applicant is entitled? 66 Recently
in Mathews v. Eldridge,67 the Court stated that competing
interests of the parties must be weighed and balanced in order
to determine what procedures are required.2 8 The central issue
is what kind of hearing applicants are entitled to upon rejection
by the section 8 landlord. In Davis v. Toledo Metropolitan
Housing Authority69 and Neddo v. Housing Authority,20 lower
federal courts have held that applicants denied admission to
conventional public housing are entitled to a Goldberg-type
hearing.2 1 A series of New York state court cases chose not to
follow this precedent and held that the applicant is entitled to
an informal interview at which the housing authority must
apprise him of the reasons for nonadmission.
2
2 See text accompanying notes 168-69 supra.
10 See Remarks of Secretary Patricia Roberts Harris at National Housing Confer-
ence, Washington, D.C., published in HUD News, March 7, 1977. If tenants in § 8
housing do not have a property interest in continued occupancy, applicants for admis-
sion certainly do not. See notes 162-78 supra and accompanying text for the proposition
that continued occupancy in assisted units creates a property interest.
21 See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
2 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
21 See text accompanying notes 179-86 supra for an analysis of this balancing
process.
21, 311 F. Supp. 795 (1970).
210 335 F. Supp. 1397 (1971).
21 Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(3) (Supp. V 1975); 24 C.F.R. § 860.207(a) (1977)
(statutory right to informal hearing).
2 See Spady v. Mount Vernon Hous. Auth., 341 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1973), aff'd, 310
N.E.2d 542, 354 N.Y.S.2d 942 (mem.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 483 (1974); Sumpter v.
White Plains Hous. Auth., 328 N.Y.S.2d 649, 278 N.E.2d 892, cert. denied, 406 U.S.
928 (1972); Velez v. Christian, 347 N.Y.S.2d 536 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
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An inherent problem in requiring a Goldberg-type hearing
in all section 8 admissions cases is the burden that would be
imposed upon the private owner. In the existing housing pro-
gram the PHA makes the initial decision whether to issue a
certificate of family participation. 213 It is at this stage of the
admissions process that the administrative burden of providing
a hearing would be least oppressive because PHA's are
equipped to, and in fact do, conduct Goldberg-type hearings on
their eviction cases. ' However, once the certificate of family
participation is granted, the decision to rent an existing unit
rests almost entirely with the private owner.2 5 Likewise, the
private owner has almost unchecked discretion in admissions
to newly constructed and substantially rehabilitated units .26 In
these two programs there would be a real administrative bur-
den on the private owner if such hearings were required upon
rejection of applicants. This would most likely discourage pri-
vate owners from participating in the program, especially since
the number of rejected applications will far exceed evictions.
It is unlikely that courts would balance the interests to require
such hearings.
Nevertheless, applicants, like section 8 tenants who are
threatened with eviction, have an important interest in living
in decent, affordable housing. As noted in the discussion of
property interests in admissions,2 ' section 8 owners have wide
discretion under the regulations to establish preferences and
priorities. However, under Colon v. Tompkins Square5 and
similar cases, any preferences must bear a rational relationship
to the goals of the housing program.2 9 In addition, Colon would
seem to require that section 8 owners adopt public, uniform
admission criteria and allow access to a waiting list based on
reasonable priorities .21 Furthermore, rejected applicants
"I See notes 206-07 supra and accompanying text.
2" 24 C.F.R. § 866 Part B (1977).
275 See notes 212, 225-26, 230-32 supra and accompanying text regarding the
owner's discretion in the admission process.
2' See notes 213-20, 225-32 supra and accompanying text regarding the owner's
discretion in the admission process.
21' See notes 244-64 supra and accompanying text.
21 294 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
2' See notes 252, 253 supra and accompanying text.
2 See note 256 supra and accompanying text. A waiting list based strictly on
chronological order could probably not be required since priorities can be adopted. See
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should have the right to be informed of the reason for rejec-
tion.28,
In light of Eldridge it is unlikely that the applicant has a
constitutional right to anything more than notice of the reason
for the adverse decision, with perhaps an informal interview
with the owner. Nevertheless, a rejected applicant's right to a
decision based on uniform standards and notice of reasons for
rejection is meaningless unless he can object to a decision arbi-
trarily and incorrectly applying those standards.28 2 It would
seem that as a matter of public policy, a realistic procedural
safeguard should provide for administrative review by an im-
partial fact-finder3m From a constitutional standpoint a re-
jected applicant should, at the very least, have access to the
courts to attack the owner's application of the standards as an
abuse of discretion on a case-by-case basis.8 4
CONCLUSION
It appears that the section 8 program, as implemented by
HUD regulations, has potential for arbitrary practices and poli-
cies by owners in admissions and evictions. Given that govern-
ment involvement in the form of financial support and regula-
tion is sufficient to bring section 8 admissions and evictions
under the due process clause, the courts should recognize the
entitlements of tenants and applicants. Tenancies would not
be terminated by owners except for "good cause" to be deter-
notes 212, 217, 256 supra and accompanying text.
211 See Colon v. Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 134, 139
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). Cf. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (public school students must
be given notice of the charges against them and an opportunity for an informal hearing
prior to suspension for misconduct).
"2 See cases cited in notes 253 and 281 supra.
24 In Leased Housing Program, supra note 2, at 1214-15, the conclusion is that
such a procedure is constitutionally required.
21 One possible basis for judicial review of the owner's rejection is the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. The Act provides in part for judicial review
of final agency action for which there is no adequate remedy in a court. Id. § -704. It is
unlikely that denial of admission by a private § 8 owner constitutes "final agency
action" within the purview of the Act. Cf. Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243 (1st Cir.
1970). It is also arguable that arbitrary and capricious action by the owner constitutes
a violation of due process. See, e.g., Homes v. New York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d
262 (2d Cir. 1968); Colon v. Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 134, 139
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). Cf. Zobriscky v. Los Angeles County, 105 Cal. Rptr. 121 (Ct. App.
1972) (welfare applications).
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mined in judicial proceedings. Admissions would be based on
public and uniform standards of individual owners subject to
HUD regulations. Rejected applicants would be entitled to
know the reason for refusal and have the opportunity to obtain
judicial relief if an owner's application of the standards consti-
tutes an abuse of discretion. If the courts subject section 8
owners to these minimal due process requirements and if HUD
aggressively enforces site selection requirements, then the pro-
gram may actually give lower income persons an opportunity
for better housing.
